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Based on an analysis of the relevant Chinese laws and regulations governing
the corporate governance structure of venture capital (“VC”)-invested firms,
as well as a discussion on the feasibility of employing different alternatives
to make direct and indirect VC investments in Chinese portfolio firms, this
article studies a hand-collected sample consisting of the twenty-nine VC-
backed Chinese portfolio firms that have been financed and listed from
1990 to 2005 in order to empirically show how these investments were actu-
ally made in practice. The findings show that twenty-three out of the twenty-
nine firms received their VC investments in various offshore holding enti-
ties, while only four firms were financed domestically, reflecting the com-
mon practice of using offshore investment structures to invest in Chinese
firms.
Although using such structures can be technically viewed as relocating VC-
financed Chinese firms abroad, doing so is different from strategic corpo-
rate relocations motivated by the need to access more efficient legal and
economic conditions. Instead of being relocated to the United States, most
firms actually move to foreign tax havens, such as the Cayman Islands or
the British Virgin Islands. It can be argued that the corporate relocation
phenomenon in China’s financings actually reflects more of a contracting
technique to circumvent unfavorable Chinese laws and more conveniently
implement United States-style contracts. In this sense, and within the partic-
ular setting of China, real strategic corporate relocation in VC finance is not
really yet an issue.
* Jing Li is lecturer and Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Business Law at Tilburg
University; LL.M. 2010, Duisenberg School of Finance; MPhil. 2008, Tilburg University;
LL.M. 2004, Stockholm University; and LL.B. 2003, University of International Business and
Economics. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Second Annual Online
Workshop on Venture Capital and Private Equity in the Asia Pacific Region (The University
of New South Wales, December 6, 2011). The author acknowledges with gratitude Professors
Armin Schwienbacher, Jo-Ann Suchard, Christoph van der Elst and Erik Vermeulen, for
their inspirational and insightful comments on this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Private equity (“PE”) is an important alternative investment instru-
ment, distinct from public equity (stock markets) and debt (loans). Essen-
tially, PE refers to privately organized pools of capital that explicitly aim
at increasing their value through active engagement with the companies in
which they invest (usually called “portfolio companies”).1 As an important
sub-type of private equity, venture capital is typically specialized in pro-
viding capital to new, growth businesses. Venture Capital (“VC”) invest-
ments consist of three phases: first, venture capitalists purchase the shares
of a portfolio company and become a shareholder therein.2 Second,
through sophisticated investment contracts, VC investors maintain effec-
tive control and monitoring of the portfolio companies3 and keep their
equity positions on average for three to seven years, during which time the
portfolio company will grow and expand.4 Finally, VC investors will exit
their investments by selling their shares in the portfolio company to other
investors or upon the portfolio company getting floated in a stock mar-
ket.5 As VCs play a key role in helping business start-ups obtain funding
for their growth, they are considered to be beneficial to national economic
development by fostering innovation and entrepreneurship.
Given the wide dispersion of potential outcomes for start-up firms as
well as the limited capacity of parties in processing information, dealing
with complexity and pursuing rational aims, adverse selection (informa-
tion) and moral hazard (incentive) problems inevitably surround the VC
investment process.6 Although the ultimate goal of both VC investors and
the entrepreneurs they finance is to seek the increase of the market value
of portfolio companies, there can be potential conflicts of interest between
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs when they both become sharehold-
ers in the portfolio company. In order to mitigate these conflicts and re-
duce associated agency costs, both business parties need to develop
1. See Guide on Private Equity and Venture Capital for Entrepreneurs, EVCA, http://
www.evca.eu/entrepreneur/default.aspx?id=3218.
2. William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organiza-
tions, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 503 (1990) (submitting that “[t]he basic document that governs
the relationship between the venture capital firm and the venture is the stock purchase agree-
ment”). See also Vance H. Fried et al., Strategy and the Board of Directors in Venture Capital-
Backed Firms, 13 J. BUS. VENTURING 493, 494 (1998).
3. See William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organi-
zations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 506 (1990); see also Thomas Hellmann, Allocation of Control
Rights in Venture Capital Contracts, 29 RAND J. ECON. 57 (1998); and Steven N. Kaplan &
Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of
Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281 (2003).
4. Douglas Cumming & Uwe Walz, Private Equity Returns and Disclosure Around
the World, 41 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 727, 728 (2010).
5. ALEXANDER HAISLIP, ESSENTIALS OF VENTURE CAPITAL 176 (2010).
6. See R. Amit, J. Brander & C. Zott, Venture Capital Financing of Entrepreneurship:
Theory, Empirical Evidence and a Research Agenda, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Donald L. Sexton & Hans Landström eds., 2000).
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efficient measures to equalize access to information and to align the inter-
ests of both sides. This is done by separately allocating the cash flow,
board seats, liquidation, and other control rights in the financial contracts
entered into by and between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur,
where the venture capitalist typically acquires disproportionally larger
control rights than the size of his equity investments.7 In the United
States, whose venture capital industry is always held up as an example for
other nations, venture capitalists make extensive use of convertible securi-
ties, in particular convertible preferred stock as the investment vehicle of
choice.8
Thanks to its strong economic growth momentum, China’s PE and VC
industry has observed tremendous development during the past two de-
cades. From a little-known concept in the early 1990s when the earliest
foreign PE investors entered China and led the first wave of such invest-
ments,9 the PE and VC industries are now a critical component of the
country’s increasingly multi-layered capital market.10 From 2003 to 2010,
the compound growth of China’s private equity industry was 40%.11 For-
eign venture capitalists have managed to maintain their leading position as
the major player in China’s new venture financing market since their first
entry in the 1990s. Local venture capitalists claim that foreign venture cap-
ital firms represented about eight of the top ten venture investors in
China.12 This only changed in 2009, when the amount of capital newly
raised for Renminbi denominated funds exceeded that of foreign currency
funds for the first time, mainly because the global financial crisis made it
difficult for foreign funds in general to raise money, while fundraising in
China benefited from the swelling assets of government agencies such as
pension funds and insurance companies.13 Moreover, the launch of
ChiNext in that year also helped to provide an attractive exit channel for
Chinese VC financing transactions.14 As a result of these positive develop-
7. Andrei A. Kirilenko, Valuation and Control in Venture Finance, 56 J. FIN. 565, 565
(2001).
8. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 284
(2003).
9. FENG ZENG, VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IN CHINA 51 (2004), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/RGSD180.html.
10. See Lawrence Zhan Zhang, The Legal Environment for Foreign Private Equity
Firms in China, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 839, 844-46 (2011).
11. ZERO2IPO RESEARCH CENTER, 2010 STATISTICS FOR THE VENTURE CAPITAL AND
PRIVATE EQUITY MARKETS IN CHINA, 13, 16 (2010).
12. David Ahlstrom et al., Venture Capital in China: Past, Present, and Future, 24 ASIA
PAC. J MGMT. 247, 251 (2007).
13. Bei Hu, Chinese Private Equity Firms Take Market Share, McKinsey Says, BLOOM-
BERG, Mar. 14, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-24/chinese-private
-equity-firms-take-market-share-mckinsey-says.html.
14. Heda Bayron, Going Local, 7 A PLUS 24, 25 (2010).
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ments, a new era of “National PE Fad” is said to have unfolded in China,15
and foreign investors have indicated their continuing confidence in the
young, yet rapidly growing market.16
Despite the fact China’s VC investment market is highly dynamic, the
manner of financing Chinese portfolio companies does not fully follow the
highly successful United States (“U.S.”) VC model. Although U.S.-style
VC contracts are considered as the efficient solution to agency problems
as they are consistent with the prediction of financial contracting theo-
ries,17 Chinese VC investment agreements differ in many respects from
those in the U.S. For example, Chinese VC firms differ from their foreign
counterparts in terms of using control and incentive mechanisms to en-
hance performance and manage risks in portfolio companies. In particular,
because of the general lack of a share-based system for closely-held com-
panies under the current Chinese corporate law, it is difficult for Chinese
VC investment contracts to directly make use of convertible securities. In
addition to designing a new model of venture capital financing contracts
particularly applicable within the Chinese legal context, more venture cap-
italists have chosen an indirect approach: relocating Chinese portfolio
companies to a foreign jurisdiction, whose legal regime would allow them
to use U.S.-style VC contracts to provide the financing. Under such an
indirect approach, both the investment and the exit of a VC financing deal
are completed outside of China.18
The correlation between a country’s “legality” and the structure of
venture capital investments has already generated considerable interest in
academia. This is especially after the publishing of the seminal LLSV se-
ries of “law and finance” papers,19 which found that the quality of corpo-
rate law, particularly in terms of providing shareholder protection, has a
positive effect on economic and financial development. More recently, re-
search completed by Professors Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher
has approached this issue by specifically studying the corporate relocations
15. “National PE Fad” is a new phrase which became increasingly popular among Chi-
nese media from 2010 to describe the current prosperity (or even overheating) of the indus-
try. For a general review, see Chen Huiying et al., Quanmin PE Re ( ) [National PE
Fad], 399 XINSHIJI ZHOUKAN ( ) [CAIXIN CENTURY] (2010), available at http://
magazine.caing.com/2010/cwcs399/.
16. China Private Equity Confidence Survey, Deloitte Financial Advisory Services
(Sep. 2010), at 5, http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-China/Local%20Assets/Documents/
Services/Financial%20advisory%20services/cn_fas_Chinaprivateequityconfidencesurvey
2010_111110.pdf (demonstrating that between 2008-2010 foreign investors expressed gener-
ally positive opinions about long-term confidence in the Chinese PE/VC market).
17. For a short review of the relevant financial contracting theories on VC investment
process, see Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Contracts, Characteristics, and Actions: Evi-
dence from Venture Capitalist Analyses, 59 J. FIN. 2117, 2117-18 (Oct. 2004).
18. Further discussed in infra Section 3.3.
19. See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131
(1997); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La
Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000).
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of VC-financed companies in twelve Asia-Pacific countries.20 Such reloca-
tion involves the incorporation of a new company in the destination coun-
try, and the issuing of new private equity to the venture capitalist.21
According to Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher, venture capitalists’
motivations for relocating companies place particular emphasis on legal
protections to shareholders and economic conditions to enhance firm
value before exiting the investment.22
The paper by Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher only focuses on
corporate relocations to the U.S.23 A closer examination at China’s ven-
ture capital relocations, however, reveals a different picture. In examining
twenty-nine VC-financed Chinese firms that were financed and listed dur-
ing 1990-2005, thirteen firms were found to already have foreign presences
before the first round of VC investment, and ten firms were relocated
outside of China upon receiving their first round of VC investment.24 In-
stead of going to the U.S., the destinations of the relocations (both the
ones pre- and upon the first round of VC financing) were offshore tax
havens such as the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. Only
four firms were financed within the Chinese border, while twenty-three
firms received VC investments in their offshore holding entities.25 While it
may be convincing to hypothesize that venture capitalists move their port-
folio companies from developing countries such as China to the U.S. in
order to access better legal protection and economic conditions, especially
given that the U.S. is the most developed economy in the world with top-
tier legal protection available for investors, it is doubtful that this hypothe-
sis still holds if the relocation destinations are other non-U.S. tax haven
jurisdictions. A competing argument would emphasize the influence of
venture capitalists’ past experience. As foreign venture capitalists have
been the leading investors in China’s new venture financing market, the
frequent relocation of Chinese portfolio companies to a foreign jurisdic-
tion can render it practically easier for them to use U.S.-style VC invest-
ment contracts, which they are familiar with.
Although it is common knowledge among lawyers specializing in this
field of practice in China that many VC investments into Chinese portfolio
companies are done by establishing an offshore entity and relocating Chi-
nese firms abroad, academic research on this issue is still scarce and lacks
an empirical touch. This paper is the first effort to show on an empirical
level how VC investments in Chinese firms are actually made. This paper
will analyze which of the two competing arguments mentioned above, ei-
ther (i) access to better legal protection and economic conditions or (ii)
20. Douglas Cumming et al., Corporate Relocation in Venture Capital Finance, 3 EN-
TREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 1121 (2009).
21. Id, at 1121.
22. Id, at 1123, 1149.
23. Id, at 1130.
24. Further discussed in infra Section IV.
25. Further discussed in infra Section IV.
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past experience of venture capitalists, has more bearing on the current
Chinese venture capital investment process.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a brief introduc-
tion of the economic problems in the venture capital financing process,
together with a review of the relevant literature. Section III discusses the
practice of how foreign VC investments are made into non-listed firms in
China, focusing particularly on the establishing of an offshore holding
structure to contemplate many of such investments. Section IV presents
and analyzes the data, and Section V concludes that compared to the influ-
ence of legality and economic conditions, the experience of venture capital
funds is a better explanation for the corporate relocation phenomenon in
China’s VC financings, which actually reflects more of a contracting tech-
nique to circumvent unfavorable Chinese laws and conveniently imple-
ment U.S.-style contracts.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Economic Problems of Venture Capital Financing
Consistent with classic agency theory, the VC financing process can be
understood from the agency perspective, where venture capitalists are
principals and entrepreneurs are agents.26 The economic problems of the
new venture financing process can be observed in two phases, namely, pre-
contractual information costs, and post-contractual incentive conflicts.27 In
order to minimize the agency costs resulting from such information and
incentive problems, the main strategy for both sides of VC investment
transactions is to improve information as well as to align interests.28 This
can be done in three ways: sophisticated financial contracting, pre-invest-
ment screening, and post-investment monitoring and advising.29
Before entering into financial contracts to invest, VC investors will col-
lect information about a pool of potential firms, usually by conducting
“due diligence”.30 Based on the information found, venture capitalists can
compare different firms and “screen out” undesirable projects ex ante.31
Once the contracts are concluded and VC investors become shareholders
in the portfolio company, the potential opportunism arising from informa-
26. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Venture Capitals as Principals: Con-
tracting, Screening, and Monitoring, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 426, 426 (2001).
27. JANET KIHOLM SMITH & RICHARD L. SMITH, ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE 396-
405 (2004).
28. See Ronald Gilson et al., Building Foundations for a Durable Deal, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2006, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/d4108446-5933-11db-9eb1-0000779
e2340.html#axzz1qtARpFs6.
29. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Venture Capitals as Principals: Contracting,
Screening, and Monitoring, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 426, 429 (2001).
30. CTR. FOR PRIVATE EQUITY & ENTREPRENEURSHIP, TUCK SCH. OF BUS. AT
DARTMOUTH, NOTE ON DUE DILIGENCE IN VENTURE CAPITAL (2004) available at http://
mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pecenter/research/pdfs/due_diligence.pdf.
31. Id. at 3.
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tion asymmetry problem32 is then mitigated by closely monitoring and ad-
vising the entrepreneurs during business operation, stressing the incentives
to exit, and using proper syndication and staging of financing.33 These
mechanisms fundamentally serve a critical purpose: they help venture cap-
italists to collect and generate information about the prospects of the start-
up firm.34 Moreover, venture capitalists have also come up with solutions
for the so-called hold-up problem35 by making widespread use of non-
compete and vesting provisions.36 Essentially, these contractual provisions
are meant to control founders and other key participants by making it
costly for them to leave the firm,37 thus achieving the purpose of keeping
them working diligently for the entrepreneurial firm for a reasonable time
after the VC investment.
The world of finance offers few more interesting examples of sophisti-
cated financial contracting than venture capital investment agreements.38
Incentive conflicts between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists are pri-
marily mitigated by structuring financial contracts so that cash flow rights,
liquidation rights, and control rights are efficiently allocated to ensure en-
trepreneurs’ commitment to the firm.39 By accepting venture capital, en-
trepreneurs are giving up not only their equity interests but also significant
control rights to the venture capitalists,40 and in order to gradually regain
their control, entrepreneurs have to devote time and energy into the port-
folio company to improve the firm’s performance. In the most ideal scena-
rio, the portfolio performs so well that it finally achieves an initial public
32. See Steven Globerman & Aidan R. Vining, An Outsourcing Decision: A Strategic
Framework, in GLOBAL OUTSOURCING STRATEGIES: AN INTERNATIONAL REFERENCE ON
EFFECTIVE OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIPS 8 (Peter Barrar & Roxane Gervais eds., 2006)
(submitting that “opportunism arising from information asymmetry can occur either at the
contract negotiation stage. . . or post-contractually. . . Either party may generate these
costs.”).
33. See PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 130 (1999).
34. Id.
35. For a general explanation of what a hold-up problem is, see William P. Rogerson,
Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 777, 777 (1992). For a
explanation of hold-up problems in venture capital financing context, see Steven N. Kaplan &
Per Strömberg, Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist
Analyses, 59 J. FIN. 2173, 2174 (2004).
36. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 292
(2003).
37. Id.
38. William L. Megginson, Toward a Global Model of Venture Capital?, 16 J. APPLIED
CORP.FIN. 89, 101 (2004).
39. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 282
(2003) (submitting that “cash flow rights and control rights can be separated and made con-
tingent on observable and verifiable measures of performance”).
40. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Does Venture Capital Require an Active
Stock Market? 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 36, 43 (1999).
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offering (“IPO”) with the venture capitalists losing their control rights as a
result of convertible securities being automatically converted into common
stock, and the negative covenants contained in the investor rights agree-
ment also terminating upon an IPO. Control thus becomes vested in the
entrepreneur again.41 In practice, venture capital is often staged, which
serves as an incentive for the entrepreneurs to work diligently in order to
obtain further rounds of money, leaving venture capitalists with a valuable
option to deny or delay additional funding.42 Entrepreneurs and venture
capitalists usually agree on certain milestones, the achievement of which
directly conditions the allocation of control between the two sides. If the
firm performs well, venture capitalists will gradually give up their control
(e.g., in voting rights and board representation), and only retain cash flow
rights (in share value and dividends).43 On the contrary, if the firm turns
out not to run so well, venture capitalists will substantially strengthen their
control in the portfolio company, so as to at least secure some returns on
their investments. In addition, VC investment contracts are also distin-
guished by their extensive and sophisticated use of covenants, which serve
to limit opportunistic behavior by the entrepreneur.44 The restrictiveness
of the contracts in terms of both the probability of including specific cove-
nants and the number of covenants included are positively related to po-
tential agency costs.45
The strategies of contracting, screening, and monitoring are closely re-
lated to each other,46 and need to be taken into account together as a
dynamically operating mechanism. This mechanism is most sufficiently re-
flected in the private ordering nature of financial contracts of VC invest-
ments in the U.S., which have served as an important factor contributing
to the great success of the Silicon Valley.47 Other critical factors include:
favorable tax laws and legal structures that can accommodate the estab-
lishment of PE funds; liberal bankruptcy laws that can provide little or no
41. Id.
42. William L. Megginson, Toward a Global Model of Venture Capital?, 16 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 89, 102 (2004); see also Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and
the Staging of Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN. 1461 (1995).
43. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 295
(2003).
44. Ola Bengtsson, Covenants in Venture Capital Contracts, 57 MGMT. SCI. 1926, 1927
(2011).
45. Paul A. Gompers, Ownership and Control in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Examina-
tion of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital Investments 26 (Sep. 1997) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/pgompers/Convert.PDF.
46. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Venture Capitals as Principals: Contracting,
Screening, and Monitoring, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 426, 429 (2001).
47. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the Ameri-
can Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2003).
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time to discharge debts for entrepreneurs;48 a clustering of venture capital
firms at one end and entrepreneurs at the other;49 simultaneity of capital,
specialized financial intermediaries, and entrepreneurs;50 and most impor-
tantly, a strong stock market.51
In countries with a common law tradition, particularly the U.S.52 and
the United Kingdom,53 venture capitalists make investments by exten-
sively using convertible quasi-equity instruments, typically convertible pre-
ferred stock.54 Convertible preferred stock is a type of stock that includes
an option for the holders (venture capitalists) to convert the preferred
shares into a certain number of common shares.55 Being preferred, this
type of stock carries rights in dividend payments and liquidation that are
senior and prior than common stock,56 so that their holders can be better
protected from the potential downside of VC investments. Being converti-
ble, this type of stock also offers venture capitalists with the flexibility to
change the level of their control in different situations.57 Generally, ven-
ture capitalists call for conversions in two different types of situations.
When the business is under way, conversion is usually based upon the real-
ization of an observable contingency by the portfolio company, such as
achieving a certain financial performance.58 VC investors have to monitor
the business and finances of the company so as to determine whether and
48. John Armour & Douglas J. Cumming, The Legislative Road to Silicon Valley, 58
OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 596, 596 (2006).
49. Masahiko Aoki & Hirokazu Takizawa, Information, Incentives, and Option Value:
The Silicon Valley Model, 30 J. COMP. ECON. 759, 761 (2002).
50. Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the Ameri-
can Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1093 (2003).
51. Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, Does Venture Capital Require an Active
Stock Market?, 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 36 (1999); Leslie A. Jeng & Philippe C. Wells, The
Determinants of Venture Capital Funding: Evidence Across Countries, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 241
(2000).
52. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 284
(2003).
53. Mike Wright, Venture Capital in China: A View from Europe, 24 ASIA PAC. J.
MGMT. 269, 276 (2007).
54. Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Trans-
actions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equity, 120 Q. J. ECON. 223, 223 (2005).
55. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, COORDINATED PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT
SURVEY GUIDE 144 (2002).
56. See Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Struc-
ture: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 882 (2003);
see also id., submitting that “[p]referred stock has a claim prior to that of common stock upon
the earnings of a corporation and upon the assets of the corporation in the event of its
liquidation.”
57. William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organiza-
tions, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 510 (1990).
58. George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital. 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 317 (2001).
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when to call for such conversions. Once a conversion is called and pre-
ferred stock is converted into common stock, venture capitalists lose the
preferential rights on their shares,59 thus relinquishing a certain amount of
their control of the company.
If the company is eventually listed on a stock exchange, VC investors
can sell their shares at the stock market and gain multiplied returns on
their investments.60 Having achieved the goal of their investments to turn
profit, they no longer need the economic and contractual protections pro-
vided by the convertible preferred stock, all of which will thus be automat-
ically converted into common stock upon the IPO of the company
(automatic conversion).61 On the contrary, if the company fails to perform
well and no IPO takes place, VC investors may still secure at least some
returns upon their exit by virtue of the redemption rights,62 preferred divi-
dends,63 and liquidation preferences64 provided by convertible preferred
stock. In this sense, convertible preferred stock is a highly useful invest-
ment instrument, one which efficiently addresses the information and in-
centive problems between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs.
59. Timothy J. Harris, Modeling the Conversion Decision of Preferred Stock, 58 BUS.
LAW. 587, 588 (2003).
60. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Does Venture Capital Require an Active
Stock Market? 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 36, 42 (2005) (arguing that “[t]he potential for an
IPO to provide a higher-valued exit than sale of the company must be considered plausible”).
61. Automatic conversion can also happen prior to the IPO, e.g., upon reaching certain
profit, sales, and/or performance milestones. In general, venture capitalists would want con-
version only when they have positive information that the firm is likely to be successful. See
Paul A. Gompers, Ownership and Control in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Examination of Con-
vertible Securities in Venture Capital Investments 16-17 (Sep. 1997) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/pgompers/Convert.PDF.
62. Redemption clauses give venture capitalists the right to demand that the firm re-
deem the their claim, typically at the price that the VC has originally paid for purchasing
equity interests from the firm (or occasionally, at the maximum of the liquidation value and
“fair market value”). This is very similar to the required repayment of principal at the matur-
ity of a debt claim. See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory
Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON.
STUD. 281, 291 (2003). So when the portfolio firm does not present strong growth and thus
cannot bring out lucrative exits for venture capitalists, they can still get back at least their
original investment, sometimes even with a moderate return, by exercising the redemption
right.
63. Venture capitalists may ask for cumulative dividends in their investment terms,
which can make their liquidation rights even stronger. Even though these are dividends that
do not have to be paid out, they accumulate and are added to the liquidation claim when
venture capitalists eventually exercise their liquidation preference rights. See Steven N.
Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical
Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 290 (2003).
64. By virtue of liquidation preference, venture capitalist will be able to share prior to
common stock holders upon the earnings of a corporation and upon the assets of the corpo-
ration in the event of its liquidation. Therefore, even if the company is doing not very well
and there is not much left as of the liquidation, venture capitalists may still secure some of
their original investments. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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2.2 Venture Capital Investments in China
Venture capital in China is seen as a politically legitimate and neces-
sary means of linking science and technological development with national
economic development.65 Within this system, there are primarily four
types of VC firms: governmental VCs, university VCs, corporate VCs, and
foreign VCs.66 Although the very first VC firm was established in China as
early as 1985 (with the operation starting in 1986),67 the modern en-
trepreneurial finance VC concept was brought into China by foreign VC
firms, which differ from Chinese domestic counterparts in several impor-
tant aspects. Foreign venture capitalists tend to focus on high-growth or
high-potential investment projects, which are not necessarily limited to
high technology firms.68 They surpass domestic Chinese VC firms in terms
of experience, and thus are poised to provide more value-added services.69
They are also more actively involved in monitoring and top-level decision-
making.70 However, foreign VCs are more politically vulnerable as they
do not have as close connections with governmental bodies as domestic
VCs.71 Moreover, foreign VCs generally also invest more in firms at ear-
lier stages than domestic VCs. This being said, venture capitalists in China
generally attach a greater priority to later stages such as growth and pre-
IPO.72
Previous research on venture capital investments in China has prima-
rily focused on pinning down the possible institutional factors that may
explain the difference of venture capitalists’ operations here from those in
more mature markets. One of the major insights was that while venture
capitalists attempted to follow the same model of the West, key institu-
tional and cultural issues strongly impacted the actual actions taken.73
65. Steven White et al., Financing New Ventures in China: System Antecedents and
Institutionalization, 34 RES. POL’Y 894, 901 (2005). See also Justin Tan et al., Managing Risk
in a Transitional Environment: An Exploratory Study of Control and Incentive Mechanisms of
Venture Capital Firms in China, 46 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 263, 268 (2008).
66. Steven White et al., China’s Venture Capital Industry: Institutional Trajectories and
System Structure, International Conference on Financial Systems 9 (2002), available at http://
knowledge.insead.edu/abstract.cfm?ct=11674.
67. The firm is named China New Technology Venture Investment Co.
68. Steven White et al., Financing New Ventures in China: System Antecedents and
Institutionalization, 34 RES. POL’Y 894, 907 (2005).
69. Justin Tan et al., Managing Risk in a Transitional Environment: An Exploratory
Study of Control and Incentive Mechanisms of Venture Capital Firms in China, 46 J. SMALL
BUS. MGMT. 263, 281 (2008).
70. Id. at 280.
71. Steven White et al., China’s Venture Capital Industry: Institutional Trajectories and
System Structure, International Conference on Financial Systems 10 (2002), available at http://
knowledge.insead.edu/abstract.cfm?ct=11674.
72. Justin Tan et al., Managing Risk in a Transitional Environment: An Exploratory
Study of Control and Incentive Mechanisms of Venture Capital Firms in China, 46 J. SMALL
BUS. MGMT. 263, 281 (2008).
73. David Ahlstrom et al., Venture Capital in China: Past, Present, and Future, 24 ASIA
PAC. J. MGMT. 247, 252 (2007).
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With weak formal institutions in East Asian economies, existing relation-
ships are an important factor in screening firms and providing funding.
Venture capitalists monitor firms through informal ties to entrepreneurs
and their families. They create links to customers, the government, and
other important allied firms through personal connections.74 Similarly, en-
trepreneurs’ social capital plays an important role in China’s venture capi-
tal industry, in that it has a significant effect on both investment selection
decisions and investment process decisions of venture capitalists.75 Ven-
ture capitalists weigh human capital factors more heavily in China than in
the U.S., but also rely on market information, which augments rather than
replaces human capital factors.76 In particular, both foreign VCs and do-
mestic Chinese VCs exhibit investment behavior based on learned paths to
success within different institutional environments.77 For example, foreign
VCs tend to invest in technology-light, service-oriented ventures because
based on their previous experience from advanced countries (particularly
the U.S.), legal protection of intellectual property is critical to their success
while possible intellectual property theft in China still remains a
concern.78
In summary, previous research efforts so far show that venture capital
investments in China are done differently from developed markets as a
result of China’s unique institutional context. It is in general not the pri-
mary concern of existing research efforts to focus on analyzing VC invest-
ment practice, although they indeed touch on specific practical issues that
are discussed here and there. For example, venture capitalists indicate that
they expect to make greater efforts to do due diligence in China than in
the West when screening entrepreneurial firms, and they realize that when
there is a need for managerial input, it is key to allow managers the oppor-
tunity to maintain “face” or respect.79 Although such findings indeed un-
veil certain practical behaviors in Chinese VC investments, they do not
educate readers on how VC investments are actually made into Chinese
entrepreneurial firms. This research thus bridges the gap between theory
and practice by painting a picture of the legal arrangements used in the
practice of making venture capital and private equity investments in
China, and it also discusses the theoretical implications thereof.
74. David Ahlstrom & Garry D. Bruton, Venture Capital in Emerging Economies: Net-
works and Institutional Change, 30 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRAC. 299, 316 (2006).
75. Bat Batjargal & Mannie (Manhong) Liu, Entrepreneurs’ Access to Private Equity
in China: The Role of Social Capital, 15 ORG. SCI. 159, 159 (2004).
76. Andrew L Zacharakis et al., Venture Capitalists’ Decision Policies Across Three
Countries: an Institutional Theory Perspective, 38 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 691, 691 (2007).
77. Douglas B. Fuller, How Law, Politics and Transnational Networks Affect Technol-
ogy Entrepreneurship: Explaining Divergent Venture Capital Investing Strategies in China, 27
ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 445, 455 (2010).
78. Id.
79. David Ahlstrom et al., Venture Capital in China: Past, Present, and Future, 24 ASIA
PAC. J. MGMT. 247, 256-260 (2007).
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III. MAKING VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IN CHINA
Although China has the world’s fastest growing major economy,80 until
recently venture capital and private equity have played a rather trivial role
in promoting its spectacular economic development and technological pro-
gress.81 While venture capital is a historically recent financial innovation,
the concept was largely unknown in China until the first batch of Chinese
Internet firms made their debut in NASDAQ in the early 2000, giving
fame to a number of dot-com stars such as which Sohu, Sina and
NetEase.82 As part of these cheery stories of how new college graduates
started these firms with their bare hands and ultimately managed to list
their businesses in overseas stock markets, foreign (mainly U.S.) venture
capitalists, who were the first providers of capital to these young en-
trepreneurial heroes, entered the sights of the Chinese public.83 From that
time onwards, investments made by both foreign and domestic VC funds
became more and more identified by the Chinese media. However, the
fact that foreign venture capitalists have led these burgeoning financing
activities does not necessarily mean that investments are done in China in
the same way as in the developed markets. In addition to the institutional
differences summarized in previous research pieces,84 China’s local laws
and regulations are the most direct reasons preventing VC investors from
using U.S. model contracts to provide financing in China. This gives rise to
a unique pattern of venture capital investment practices.
3.1 Practical Difficulties in Using Convertible Preferred Stock
Despite the fact that convertible preferred stock is widely used in the
U.S. venture capital industry to obtain special economic rights such as liq-
uidation preferences, anti-dilution adjustments, and other rights that are
fundamental to the financial imperatives of venture capital investors,85 the
various regulatory limitations on investing in private companies registered
in China do not yet fully reflect such prevailing practice. There are gener-
ally two types of companies in China: limited liability companies and joint
80. See Alan Chau, Doing Business in Changing China: Seeking Similarities, Respecting
Differences, 13 VIEW: PWC PERSPECTIVES ON CURRENT BUS. ISSUES & TRENDS 14, 15 (2010).
81. Cf. William L. Megginson, Toward a Global Model of Venture Capital?, 16 J. AP-
PLIED CORP. FIN. 89, 94 (2004).
82. The three Internet companies are often referred together as China’s “Big Three
Portal Websites.”
83. Su Longfei ( ), Minqi Shangshi Beiwanglu Si: Waizi VC Jinru Gongzhong
Shiye ( ) [Chronicles of Private Companies
Going Public (Part Four): Foreign VCs Entering the Public Eye], COLUMN AT SINO-
MANAGER.COM (Aug. 23, 2010), available at http://www.sino-manager.com/u/2010823_18491.
html.
84. See infra Section 2.2.
85. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 284
(2003).
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stock limited companies.86 Only joint stock limited companies can issue
shares87 and list their shares in stock exchanges upon the approval of the
securities regulator,88 while the equity system of the limited liability com-
panies is based on the percentage of capital contributions by each of the
equity holders therein.89 By virtue of such provisions, a business aiming to
attract investments from venture capitalists has to be a joint stock limited
company, or otherwise it must be restructured into a joint stock limited
company in order to issue convertible preferred stock to VC investors.
Thus, as long as VC investors can manage to find firms that are already
organized as or are willing to restructure into joint stock limited compa-
nies, they can use convertible preferred stock to make their investments.
The table 3.1 below briefly summarizes the basic differences between lim-
ited liability companies and joint stock limited companies.
86. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa ( ) [Company
Law (P.R.C.)] art. 2 (adopted at the 5th Session of the Standing Committee of the 8th Na-
tional People’s Congress, Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter “1993 Company Law”] (amended for
the 1st time, Dec. 25, 1999) [hereinafter “1999 Company Law”] (amended for the 2nd time,
Aug. 28, 2004) [hereinafter “2004 Company Law”]; (amended for the 3rd time, Oct. 27, 2005,
and took effect as from Jan. 1, 2006) [hereinafter “2006 Company Law”].
87. 2006 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 126.
88. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa ( ) [Securities
Law (P.R.C.)] art. 50 (adopted at the 6th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 9th
National People’s Congress, Dec. 29, 1998) (amended Oct. 27, 2005, and took effect as from
Jan. 1, 2006).
89. 2006 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 3.
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TABLE 3.1: LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND JOINT STOCK LIMITED
COMPANIES90
Limited Liability
Characteristics Company Joint Stock Limited Company
Equity System Equity-interest-based Share-based
Number of Between 2 – 50 Between 2 – 200
Founders /
Initiators
Form of Contribution of Promotion: Initiators subscribing for all of the
Establishment registered capital by shares to be issued by the company; or
the founders
Share Offer: Initiators subscribing for a
portion of the shares to be issued by the
company and offering the remaining shares to
the general public or a particular group of
people.91
Minimum RMB30,000 RMB5 million
Capital
Threshold
Methods for Total capital Established by Promotion: Total share capital
Capital contributions subscribed by all the initiators as registered
Contribution subscribed by all with the registration authority;
founders as registered
with the registration Established by Share Offer: Total paid-up
authority share capital as registered with the registration
authority
Timeframe for Within 2 years Established by Promotion: Within 2 years
Capital upon the date of upon the date of establishment, provided that
Contribution establishment, a minimum of 20% of the total registered
provided that a capital should have been contributed by the
minimum of 20% of initiators. Before the registered capital is paid
the total registered off, no stock may be offered to others for
capital should have subscription.
been contributed by
the founders
Governmental Possible approvals Established by Promotion: Possible approvals
Approvals from industry from industry administrative authority if the
administrative company is in certain industries (e.g.
authority if the pharmaceutical business); plus registration
company is in certain with the registration authority;
industries (e.g.
pharmaceutical Established by Share Offer: Possible approvals
business); plus from industry administrative authority if the
registration with the company is in certain industries (e.g.
registration authority. pharmaceutical business); approval from the
State Council for share offer establishment,
plus registration with the registration
authority.
90. 2006 Company Law, supra note 86, §§ 2.1, 4.1.
91. It is worth noting that although a joint stock limited company can be set up by
share offer, such method of establishment is virtually not available for start-ups.
According to Shouci Gongkai Faxing Gupiao bing Shangshi Guanli Banfa
( ) [Measures for the Administration of Initial Public
Offering and Listing of Stocks] art. 8 (promulgated by China Securities Regulatory
Commission, May 17, 2006), establishing a company by share offer is only allowed, upon the
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However, things are not as straightforward as they seem. Two general
implications can be drawn from the differences between limited liability
companies and joint stock limited companies as summarized in table 3.1
above. First, it is more costly and complicated to incorporate joint stock
limited companies as compared to limited liability companies, as the for-
mer requires much higher minimum capital requirements, and a lengthier
and more complex set of approval procedures. Although the statutory
stipulations shown in the table may not appear prohibitive as such, it is
worth noting that they only came into force from 2006 when the new Chi-
nese Company Law was enacted.92 During more than a decade after the
birth of the Company Law in 1993, entrepreneurs hoping to set-up a joint
stock limited company would have needed to obtain approval from at least
the provincial government and sometimes even from the central govern-
ment (which may delegate certain relevant governmental authorities to do
so).93
One month before the first enactment of China’s Company Law in
1993, China’s Communist Party explicitly pointed out that reforming
“state-owned enterprises as companies is a beneficial exploration along
the road of establishing modern enterprise system.”94 In a country where
state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) hold the majority of its resources and
economic lifelines, it is not hard to imagine that governments would priori-
tize their approving powers towards (large) SOE reforms.95 In addition to
the formation procedures, the formation costs of joint stock companies
were equally, if not more, prohibitive. The minimum share capital re-
quired to set up a joint stock companies was RMB10 million.96 Such a
requirement would still be applicable when a limited liability company was
approval of the State Council, when a limited liability company is to be converted into a joint
stock limited company. Conceivably, such State Council approval is to be reserved by those
large-scale state-owned enterprises, which will be converted into companies limited by share
for further listing.
92. See supra note 86.
93. 1993 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 77; 1999 Company Law, supra note 86, art.
77; 2004 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 77.
94. Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jianli Shehui Zhuyi Shichang Jingji Tizhi Ruogan
Wenti de Jueding ( ) [Decision of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Issues Concerning the
Establishment of the Socialist Market Economy], art. 2.6 (adopted by the 3rd Plenary Session
of the 14th Central Committee of China’s Communist Party, June 14, 1993), available at http:/
/cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/134902/8092314.html
95. Reform of SOEs in China is considered by the Communist Party as the most im-
portant and challenging part of China’s economic reform and establishment of socialist mar-
ket economy. Among other things, the goal of such reform is to change SOEs from
government-owned-and-run entities to modern shareholding companies. For more informa-
tion on the topic of SOE reform, see Justin Yifu Lin et al., Competition, Policy Burdens, and
State-Owned Enterprise Reform, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1998).
96. 1993 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 78; 1999 Company Law, supra note 86, art.
78; 2004 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 78.
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to convert itself into a joint stock limited company.97 By comparison, the
minimum capital thresholds for limited liability companies as set forth in
the older versions of the Company Law were RMB100,000 for scientific
and technology development, consulting, and service firms, RMB300,000
for retailing firms, and RMB500,000 for wholesale and manufacturing
firms.98 Although such figures still look quite high as compared to the
currently effective minimum capital requirement for limited liability com-
panies (i.e., RMB 30,000 as shown in table 3.1), their cost-saving effect was
still obvious if compared to the RMB10 million minimum capital require-
ment for joint limited companies. Such comparative benefits of limited lia-
bility companies are still present in the currently effective Company
Law,99 although one may argue that they do not appear so acute given
that the administrative approval burdens have also been significantly low-
ered for joint stock limited companies.
The second implication is related to the first one and is more practical.
Because of the prohibitively high costs, as well as the stringent and hierar-
chical governmental approval formalities required to establish a joint
stock limited company historically, it is natural for entrepreneurs to prefer
limited liability companies over joint stock limited companies to operate
their business. Empirically this is also true: according to the 2004 statistics
from the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, China’s top
regulator of business firm registrations, China had over 1.3 million limited
liability companies while only 8,000 joint stock limited companies (includ-
ing 1,378 firms that were listed on China’s two stock exchanges100), the
former exceeding the latter by 160 times.101 Such drastically different rates
of using the two business forms have had a direct impact in practice. One
consequence arising from the low prevalence of joint stock limited compa-
nies among non-listed firms is the difficulty of building up an ample set of
legal experience and networks associated with this business form, espe-
cially in those less developed regions of the country where lawyers and
governmental officials are even less familiar with this sort of business re-
gistration applications. This contributes to the unattractiveness of joint
97. 1993 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 98; 1999 Company Law, supra note 86, art.
98; 2004 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 98; 2006 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 9.
98. 1993 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 23; 1999 Company Law, supra note 86, art.
23; 2004 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 23. The current 2006 Company Law no longer
imposes different minimum capital requirements for different kinds of firms, but asks for a
universal minimum registered capital of RMB 30,000 for all limited liability companies. See
2006 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 26.
99. See table 3.1 above.
100. Jiezhi Qunian Niandi Woguo Jingnei Shangshi Gongsi Shangsheng Dao 1378 Jia
( ) [As of the End of Last Year, the Number of
Domestic Listed Companies Increased to 1,378], XINHUANET (Feb. 15, 2005), available at
http://news.sohu.com/20050215/n224296476.shtml.
101. Zhou Yang ( ), Xin Gongsi Fa de Xuanmiao zhi Men ( )
[What is Savvy in the New Company Law?], 12 JINGJI  ( ) [ECONOMIC MONTHLY] (2005),
available at http://biz.cn.yahoo.com/060223/147/g3pf.html.
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stock limited companies to entrepreneurs and investors, who may be de-
terred and resort back to limited liability companies even if they have the
money to satisfy the statutory minimum capital requirement for joint stock
limited companies. For venture capitalists, it is simply much more difficult
to locate potential start-ups that are already organized as joint stock lim-
ited companies when limited liability companies dominate the menu of
corporate business forms in China. Previous research shows that given the
highly asymmetric information between venture capitalists and entrepre-
neurs and the still relatively strong role played by Guanxi (i.e., connec-
tions) in Chinese business practices, deal sourcing can be particularly
difficult for venture capitalists investing in China.102 Locating potential
portfolio companies from firms that use an uncommon business form fur-
ther increases the difficulty for VC investors to find ideal business start-
ups to finance.
Although it can be expensive and even risky for business entrepre-
neurs to spend several millions of Renminbi just to register a company, it
is possible that after a period of development and expansion, some entre-
preneurs who originally opted for limited liability companies may feel the
need to change the corporate form of their ventures in order to attract
venture capitalists, given that the minimum share capital of joint stock lim-
ited companies has been halved from RMB10 million to RMB5 million,
and that most governmental approval requirements have been abolished
under the currently effective Company Law of China.103 In such a scena-
rio, the entrepreneur may consider converting the business from a limited
liability company into a joint stock limited company, so that venture capi-
talists will be able to use convertible preferred stock in making the invest-
ment. Funding businesses that are already on track is actually the
preference of most venture capitalists investing in China, as they hope to
reduce potential risks about the uncertainties of the business and yield
higher return upon exit.104 Furthermore, since IPOs are generally consid-
ered the most lucrative channel of exit and usually the best outcome ven-
ture capitalists aim for, forming a joint stock company preemptively upon
the entrance of VC investors rather than upon the eve of the IPO might
save both cost and time. This is also true in the practice of U.S. venture
capital industry, where VC investors may require the invested portfolio
company, if still not a C-corporation, to restructure itself into a C-corpora-
tion as a closing condition of an investment transaction.105 Therefore, we
102. David Ahlstrom et al., Venture Capital in China: Past, Present, and Future, 24 ASIA
PAC. J. MGMT. 247, 255 (2007).
103. See supra note 93, 96 and the accompanying texts, as well as table 3.1 above.
104. David Ahlstrom et al., Venture Capital in China: Past, Present, and Future, 24 ASIA
PAC. J. MGMT. 247, 261 (2007).
105. Eric J. Allen & Sharat Raghavan, Are Venture Capital Investments Inefficiently
Organized? Quantifying the Cost of Organizing Loss-Generating Start-up Firms as C-Corpo-
rations, 4 (July 26, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1759558.
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can expect that joint stock companies will gradually emerge as an impor-
tant business vehicle in China, especially given the growing importance
and sophistication of China’s onshore stock markets.
Despite the fact that joint stock companies are now easier to set-up
than before, such regulatory improvement still cannot be enjoyed by for-
eign investors. If foreign investors enter the shareholding of a joint stock
company, this will result in the company being turned into a foreign-in-
vested enterprise, which is mandatorily governed by the relevant foreign
direct investment (FDI) laws and regulations in China.106 Compared to a
domestic joint stock company, a foreign-funded joint stock company needs
to have at least RMB30 million registered capital, with the shares sub-
scribed and held by foreign shareholders being no less than twenty-five
percent thereof.107 Moreover, the establishment of such companies is sub-
ject to the approval of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the top
regulator of foreign direct investments in China, and not any of its lower-
level local counterparts.108 Such legal stipulations make it even more diffi-
cult for foreign venture capitalists to pursue the path of investing directly
in joint stock limited companies.
To summarize, the absence of a share-based equity system among non-
listed firms in China makes it practically difficult for venture capitalists to
make direct use of convertible preferred shares when investing in
China,109 although they are not precluded from doing so per se under the
relevant Chinese regulations.110
106. 1993 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 18; 1999 Company Law, supra note 86, art.
18; 2004 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 18. Basically, these articles stipulate that foreign-
invested enterprises, i.e., Sino-foreign equity joint ventures, Sino-foreign cooperative joint
ventures, and wholly-foreign-owned enterprises, will be governed by the specific laws and
regulations applicable to them, and company law provisions will only apply when these laws
and regulations are silent. In the current 2006 Company Law, art. 218, it is stipulated that
foreign-invested companies should comply with the Company Law; however, where there are
otherwise different provisions in any law regarding foreign investment, such provisions shall
prevail.
107. Guanyu Sheli Waishang Touzi Gufen Youxian Gongsi Ruogan Wenti de Zanxing
Guiding ( ) [Provisional Regulations on
Certain Issues Concerning the Establishment of Foreign-Funded Joint Stock Companies], art.
7 (promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Jan. 10, 1995).
Note that, unless explicitly approved by the MOFCOM to form a foreign-invested joint stock
company, all foreign-invested companies in China must take the business form of limited
liability company, thus meaning that they cannot issue shares, either common or preferred.
108. Provisional Regulations on Certain Issues Concerning the Establishment of For-
eign-Funded Joint Stock Companies, supra note 107, art. 13. See also http://gfgs.wzs.
mofcom.gov.cn/ for a detailed stipulation of the requirements for setting up a foreign-in-
vested joint stock company and selling its shares to the public.
109. Paul McKenzie, New Venture Capital Measures Reflect Policy to Cultivate Onshore
Venture Capital Industry, But Meaningful Adoption Will Require Further Definition and Cor-
porate Law Reform, MORRISON & FORESTER CHINA L. BULL. (Mar. 2006), available at http://
www.mofo.com/news/updates/bulletins/bulletin02150.html#NewVenture.
110. Chuangye Touzi Qiye Guanli Zanxing Banfa ( ) [In-
terim Measures for the Administration of Start-up Investment Enterprises], art. 15 (jointly
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3.2 Alternatives to Compensate for Such Difficulty under Chinese Laws
3.2.1 Using convertible debt
Similar to the function of convertible preferred stock, convertible notes
are a debt instrument that can be converted into equity upon the occur-
rence of an acquisition or a significant funding round,111 or some other
event at the option of the note holders, i.e., the investors.112 Convertible
debt and redeemable convertible preferred equity are essentially
equivalent in terms of the resulting payoff structure,113 and the main dif-
ference between the two instruments concerns the rights available in the
case of a default.114 While preferred shareholders do not have any particu-
lar rights in default, convertible note holders may demand that the com-
pany pay back the note together with a reasonable interest so as to secure
at least some return, or otherwise force the firm into liquidation.115 More-
over, as debt is to be repaid prior to either preferred or common stock in
the event of a sale or liquidation, convertible notes provide even more
senior protection until converted.116
Unlike convertible preferred stock, convertible notes are a way for
companies to raise capital without having to give up ownership in their
company, at least initially. From the investors’ perspective, using converti-
ble notes means that they do not have to immediately come up with a
valuation to a portfolio firm, which will be postponed to the next major
financing triggering conversion.117 The coupon rate on the convertible se-
curities is typically set at zero, which suggests that venture capitalist struc-
ture their investment in this way for contract flexibility reasons rather than
adopted by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Science and
Technology, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, the People’s Bank of China,
the State Administration of Taxation, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce,
China Banking Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulation Commission, and the
State Administration for Foreign Exchange, and promulgated by the State Council, Nov. 11,
2005).
111. Monica Mehta, Raising Capital with Convertible Notes, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 25,
2011, available at http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/jan2011/sb20110125_145583
.htm.
112. Asheesh Advani, Raising Money Using Convertible Debt, ENTREPRENEUR.COM,
May 15, 2006, available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/159520.
113. Paul A. Gompers, Ownership and Control in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Examina-
tion of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital Investments, 2 (Sep. 1997) (unpublished man-
uscript), available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/pgompers/Convert.PDF; see also Andreas
Bacha & Uwe Walz, Convertible Securities and Optimal Exit Decisions in Venture Capital
Finance, 3 J. CORP. FIN. 286, 299 (2001).
114. Andreas Bacha & Uwe Walz, Convertible Securities and Optimal Exit Decisions in
Venture Capital Finance, 3 J. CORP. FIN. 286, 299 (2001).
115. Id.
116. Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A
Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 902 (2003).
117. Asheesh Advani, Raising Money Using Convertible Debt, ENTREPRENEUR.COM,
May 15, 2006, available at http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/159520.
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to earn a positive cash flow on their private company investments.118 In
practice, convertible notes are seldom repaid because the VC investors do
not want to only get pennies on the dollar, and if the company is failing, it
is unlikely that the entrepreneurs will have the money to repay the note at
all.
Given the practical difficulties of using convertible preferred stock in
China as explained in section 3.1 above, it is natural to think about using
convertible notes, which are also often employed by venture capitalists in
their investment transactions. However, this alternative may not work out
as smoothly as contemplated. Loan transactions are strictly regulated
under Chinese law. Only financial institutions with a license for carrying
out lending business are allowed to extend loans.119 Non-financial institu-
tions, such as VC firms and portfolio companies, are generally prohibited
from extending loans to each other,120 regardless of whether the loan
would bear interest or whether the borrower is an affiliate or a third party
of the lender.
Given that China’s financial system is still dominated by a large but
underdeveloped banking sector which is more prone to lend first to state-
owned enterprises and that the domestic stock exchanges still need to
grow more effectively in allocating resources in the economy, the most
successful part of the financial system is a sector of alternative financing
channels, which rely on alternative governance mechanisms, such as trust,
reputation, and relationships.121 In practice, it is thus not uncommon to
118. William L. Megginson, Toward a Global Model of Venture Capital?, 16 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN.89, 103 (2004).
119. Daikuan Tongze ( ) [Lending General Provisions], art. 2 (promulgated by
the People’s Bank of China, June 28, 1998), available at http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/
Article/2204127/Channel/9950/Peoples-Bank-of-China-Lending-General-Provisions.html.
The term “financial institution” is explicitly defined under Chinese law to include institutions
that run financial business under the supervision and administration of China Banking Regu-
latory Commission, such as policy banks, commercial banks, rural cooperative banks, urban
credit cooperatives, rural credit cooperatives, village banks, finance companies, rural fund
cooperatives, financial asset management companies, trust companies, enterprise group fi-
nance companies, financial lease companies, auto financial companies and currency broker-
age companies, etc. See Jinrong Xukezheng Guanli Banfa ( ) [Measures
for the Administration of Financial Licenses], art. 3 (promulgated by China Banking Regula-
tory Commission, May 31, 2003) (amended on Dec. 28, 2006). Among the abovementioned
institutions, financial asset management companies are defined as solely state-owned, non-
banking financial institutions that specialize in acquiring non-performing loans from state-
owned banks, and administering and disposing of the assets resulted from acquiring such
non-performing loans. See Jinrong Zichan Guanli Gongsi Tiaoli ( )
[Regulation on Financial Asset Management Companies], art. 2 (promulgated by the State
Council, Nov. 10, 2000).
120. See Lending General Provisions, supra note 119, arts. 61, 73.
121. Franklin Allen et al., Law, Finance and Economic Growth of China, 77 J. FIN.
ECON. 57, 59-60 (2005).
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see de facto intercompany loans among business firms,122 which may be
done through the so-called “shadow banking system”123 or through vari-
ous circumventing techniques, such as “entrusted loans.”124 Recently,
even the State Administration of Taxation of China has stepped out and
benchmarked such inter-firm loans among non-financial institutions by
stipulating that “the interests paid for inter-company loans can be de-
ducted for corporate income tax purposes only to the extent that they do
not exceed the amount calculated by reference to the interest rates appli-
cable to the loans of the same category and period made by financial insti-
tutions,”125 indirectly admitting the existence of such lending in practice.
Although inter-firm lending is indeed heavily used in practice, the Chi-
nese courts have repeatedly denied its validity. In two judicial interpreta-
tions, the Supreme People’s Court of China explicitly deemed such
contracts as null and void – the borrower needs to return the principal and
will also be fined the amount equal to the interest that would have been
derived from a similar bank loan, while any interest that has accumulated
upon the loan will be confiscated from the lender.126 Although convertible
debt is more of a controlling rather than lending mechanism between ven-
ture capitalists and portfolio companies, it is doubtful whether VCs can
successfully persuade the court on this point, especially when it is illegal to
conduct inter-firm lending in the first place. As a result of such legal un-
certainty (or even illegality), the attractiveness of convertible notes is
rather limited in China. Even if venture capitalists want to use them as an
investment instrument, they should be prepared to give up the interest
122. Tracy Alloway, Michael Pettis on China’s Very Own Zaiteku, FIN. TIMES. AL-
PHAVILLE, Feb. 22, 2011, available at http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2011/02/22/494571/
michael-pettis-on-chinas-very-own-zaiteku/.
123. Henry Sender, Chinese Finance, A Shadowy Presence, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011,
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/76f6ed48-5bc4-11e0-b8e7-00144feab49a.html
#axzz1RyoVaBoh. See also China’s shadow banking system: Trust belt – Trust companies are
growing fast, fuelling fears of excessive credit growth, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 2011, availa-
ble at http://www.economist.com/node/18118975.
124. Ernest Mak, Optimizing Liquidity Management in China, BANK OF AMERICA, Feb.
15, 2006, available at http://corp.bankofamerica.com/publicpdf/products/treasury/Optimizing_
Liquidity_Management_in_China.pdf.
125. Guojia Shuiwu Zongju Guanyu Qiye Suodeshui Ruogan Wenti de Gonggao
( ) [Announcement on Certain Corporate In-
come Tax Issues] art. 1 (issued by the State Administration of Taxation, June 9, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136593/n8137537/n8138502/11596923.html.
126. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Lianying Hetong Jiufen Anjian Ruo-
gan Wenti de Jieda ( ) [Interpreta-
tion of the Supreme People’s Court of China Concerning the Trial of Disputes Arising from
Association Contracts] (issued by the Supreme Court of China, Nov. 12, 1990), available at
http://www.law-lib.com/lawhtm/1990/7105.htm; see also Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Dui
Qiye Jiedai Hetong Jiekuanfang Yuqi Bu Guihuan Jiekuan Ying Ruhe Chuli de Pifu
( ) [Reply
from the Supreme People’s Court of China on Dealing With Borrower of Inter-Firm Loan
Contract Delaying Repayment] (issued by the Supreme Court of China, Sep. 23, 1996), avail-
able at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=12765.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\1-1\MPE106.txt unknown Seq: 23 31-JUL-12 10:59
Spring 2012] Venture Capital Investments in China 23
return and pay penalty for the loan if the funded portfolio company does
not perform satisfactorily and they need to call the notes.
Using convertible notes is even more difficult for foreign venture capi-
talists, as it will be deemed as foreign debt. The concept of foreign debt is
broadly defined under the relevant Chinese laws and regulations to in-
clude any obligation or potential obligation to make payments to overseas
parties.127 A domestic Chinese non-financial entity must apply for ap-
proval from the State Development and Reform Commission,128 which
lays out the country’s comprehensive plan of economic development, in-
cluding the quota and structure for using foreign capital, in order to incur
any foreign debt with a term of one year or longer.129 The domestic Chi-
nese non-financial entity must also register the debt on a transaction-by-
transaction basis with the State Administration of Foreign Exchange
(“SAFE”),130 which is the top administrator of China’s foreign capital
flows, or else no bank will be able to open a foreign exchange account to
remit such capital into China.131 Foreign debt contracts are deemed valid
only upon such registration with SAFE.132 Furthermore, parties must also
obtain approval from the SAFE if they want to convert the foreign debt
into Renminbi for use in China, and to convert Renminbi back into for-
eign currency to repay the debt in the future.133 Given the existence of
these complicated approval and registration procedures, lending foreign
money to a domestic start-up firm is far from an easy matter. As it is not a
convenient choice for foreign venture capitalists to use convertible debt to
carry out a VC transaction in China, it is unlikely to become an effective
alternative for convertible preferred stock.
127. Waizhai Tongji Jiance Zanxing Guiding ( ) [Provisional Reg-
ulations on Statistics and Supervision of Foreign Debt], art. 3 (promulgated by the State
Administration of Exchange Control, Aug. 27, 1987). See also Waizhai Guanli Zanxing Banfa
( ) [Interim Measures on the Management of Foreign Debt] arts. 2-5
(jointly promulgated by the State Development Planning Commission, the Ministry of Fi-
nance, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Jan. 8, 2003).
128. Interim Measures on the Management of Foreign Debt, supra note 127, art. 15.
129. Guanyu Duanqi Duiwai Jiekuan Shixing Yue Waizhai Guanli de Tongzhi
( ) [Announcement on Administrating Short-
Term Foreign Debt Quotas], art. 1 (issued by the People’s Bank of China, Oct. 5, 1990),
available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=52341. Short-term foreign debt is
defined as debt borrowed by a domestic entity from a foreign entity within or equal to the
term of one year.
130. Interim Measures on Statistics and Supervision of Foreign Debt, supra note 127,
art. 5.
131. Id. at art. 6.
132. Interim Measures on the Management of Foreign Debt, supra note 127, art. 22.
133. Jiehui Shouhui Ji Fuhui Guanli Guiding ( ) [Provisions
on the Settlement and Sale of and Payment in Foreign Exchange], arts. 27, 30 (promulgated
by the People’s Bank of China, June 20, 1996). See also Interim Measures on Statistics and
Supervision of Foreign Debt, supra note 127, arts. 6-7.
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3.2.2 Separability of cash flow and control rights from equity ownership
Given the tremendous agency conflicts embedded in entrepreneurial
financing, it is not optimal to allocate ownership proportionate to residual
value, as is done in the case of common equity.134 Therefore, the central
benefit of convertible preferred stock to venture capitalists is that it allows
the separate allocation of rights of cash flow, voting, board representation,
and liquidation, etc., so that venture capitalists can have control rights
without necessarily also having the majority equity ownership in the start-
up firm.
A basic prerequisite for an arrangement similar to convertible pre-
ferred stock to function in China is for the Chinese Company Law to sepa-
rate cash flow rights, control rights, and liquidation rights from equity
ownership. By virtue of such separability, venture capitalists will then be
able to, through contractual agreements, stipulate certain preferential
rights over their equity interests in the company. This will allow venture
capitalists to effectively monitor and control entrepreneurs to ensure that
their investments are secured with some priority if the portfolio company
does not perform well, even when they do not have a majority equity stake
in the portfolio company. By doing so, venture capitalists can achieve simi-
lar results as if they had invested with convertible preferred stock,135
which is not practical for use in China.
Fortunately, according to the current Company Law of China, cash
flow rights and control rights are generally separable from equity owner-
ship. To begin with, the profits of a company do not have to be distributed
among shareholders in proportion to the corresponding percentages of
contributed capital. Instead, parties are allowed to agree otherwise, and
the agreement will prevail over the default rules in the law.136 The
mandatory requirement that shareholders only exercise their voting rights
at the shareholders’ meeting on the basis of their respective percentages of
the capital contributions137 is also lifted in the currently effective Com-
pany Law as compared to its previous versions.138 Moreover, parties can
freely agree on the circumstances to liquidate the company, which does
not have to be triggered by the insolvency or bankruptcy of the com-
134. Paul A. Gompers, Ownership and Control in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Examina-
tion of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital Investments 4 (Sep. 1997) (unpublished man-
uscript), available at http://www.people.hbs.edu/pgompers/Convert.PDF.
135. Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A
Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 882 (2003) (submit-
ting that “other securities can easily duplicate the control features of convertible preferred
stock”).
136. 2006 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 35.
137. 1993 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 41; 1999 Company Law, supra note 86, art.
41; 2004 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 41.
138. 2006 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 43.
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pany.139 However, as to liquidation rights, the Company Law does not
allow preference over certain group of shareholders, meaning that the re-
maining assets and proceeds must be distributed corresponding to the per-
centages of capital contribution.140
For foreign venture capitalists, there is another statutory alternative
offering the separability of cash flow rights and control rights from equity
ownership. The Chinese company law system can be characterized by a so-
called “legal dualism.”141 It involves a separate package of legal provisions
applicable only to Chinese-foreign joint ventures and wholly foreign-
funded firms, while the general company law will only step in if the special
stipulations are silent. Among other things, there is a business form
termed “cooperative joint venture,” which can be used by foreign inves-
tors who intend to form a joint venture with Chinese partners. Coopera-
tive joint ventures confer a high degree of contractual freedom for the two
sides to negotiate and design the corporate governance structure of the
joint venture in their agreement, which will be the highest governing au-
thority of the firm to the extent permitted by law.142 Negotiable items
include, but are not limited to, the distribution of earnings or products,
and the sharing of risks, losses, and remaining assets in the company,143
which do not need to be the same as the capital contribution percentage.
139. 2006 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 181. According to this provision, a com-
pany may be dissolved under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The duration of business operation as stipulated by the articles of association expires or
any of the matters for dissolution as stipulated in the articles of association of the company
appears;
(2) The shareholders’ meeting or the general shareholders’ meeting decides to dissolve it;
(3) It is necessary to be dissolved due to merger or division of the company;
(4) Its business licence is revoked or it is ordered to close down or to be cancelled accord-
ing to law; or
(5) The people’s court decides to dissolve it upon the request of more than 10 per cent of
the shareholders holding voting rights.
140. 2006 Company Law, supra note 86, art. 187.
141. Knut Benjamin Pissler & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance of Business Organiza-
tions in the People’s Republic of China: The Legal Framework After the Revision of the Com-
pany Law in 2005 (Oct. 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1695888.
142. See  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezuo Jingying Qiye Fa
( ) [Law on Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures
(P.R.C.)] art. 11 (adopted at the 1st Session of the 7th National People’s Congress, Apr. 13,
1988) (revised on Oct. 31, 2000) (stipulating that “a cooperative joint venture shall operate in
accordance with the approved JV contract and articles of association”). Moreover, in case
there is a discrepancy between the JV contract and JV articles of association, the JV contract
shall prevail. See art. 10 of Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezuo Jingying Qiye Fa
Shishi Xize ( ) [Detailed Rules on the Imple-
mentation of the Law on Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures (P.R.C.)] (promulgated by
the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Development, Sep. 4, 1995).
143. Arts. 2 and 21 of Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezuo Jingying Qiye
Fa ( ) [the Law on Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Ven-
tures (P.R.C.)] (adopted at the 1st Session of the 7th National People’s Congress, Apr. 13,
1988) (revised on Oct. 31, 2000).
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The major potential drawback to cooperative joint ventures is that they
are subject to a more stringent governmental review process – the joint
venture agreement and articles of association, including any material
change(s) thereto, must be approved by the relevant governmental author-
ities before they can take effect.144 Since the requirement of governmental
review is mandatory and substantive, officials may refuse to grant the ap-
proval if the submitted documentation look very different from the con-
ventional joint venture contracts that they are familiar with.145 As such,
even when an approval is finally granted, it is not certain that foreign ven-
ture capitalists will definitively obtain all the desired contractual provi-
sions they want to have in the agreement, as the officials may ask them to
amend certain parts in ways they see fit.
The chart below outlines how foreign venture capitalists can make di-
rect investments into a Chinese portfolio company.










3.3 Prevalent Offshore Investment Structure
The possibility of separating cash flow rights and control rights from
economic ownership, which was largely made possible by the currently ef-
fective Company Law (amended in 2005 and took effect as from 2006),
was not available to venture capitalists before then. Given the impractica-
bility of using convertible preferred stock in China as explained above,
144. Arts. 5 and 7 of Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures of the People’s Republic
of China, id.
145. In China, it is almost standard practice for lawyers to write the contract and arti-
cles of association of cooperative JVs in a way so as to mirror the structure of the Law on
Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures. Arguably, the legal documents so written may ap-
pear clear and straightforward in the eyes of government officials, thus may help smoothen
the approval process.
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many foreign VC funds in practice have chosen to finance their China
deals via an “offshore investment structure,” in which the capitalization
actually happens outside China while the target portfolio company inside
China only serves as an operating entity. Logically, with such offshore
funding structures, venture capitalists expect to exit from their investments
outside China, either by floating on offshore stock exchanges, or by selling
the business to other foreign acquirers. Although this offshore structure is
particularly relevant to the VC industry, it is useful for other purposes as
well. Many conventional foreign investors, such as transnational compa-
nies, also heavily rely on this structure to enter industries with restrictions
on foreign direct investment according to Chinese laws.146
This section describes “offshore investment structures,” and relevant
related laws and regulations.
3.3.1 Introduction to offshore investment structures
Offshore investment structures originate and derive from the “Chi-
nese-Chinese-Foreign” (“CCF”) financing structure, which was first in-
vented and implemented in 1994 by China Unicom, the country’s second
largest telecommunication operator, to circumvent China’s long-standing
prohibition on foreign ownership, operation, and management of telecom-
munication enterprises.147 The very first company using the offshore in-
vestment structure was reported to be Beijing Yuxing, a computer
technology firm went public in Hong Kong Stock Exchange in August
1999 via a holding company established in Bermuda.148 In the simplest
form, the structure is an offshore holding company with a Chinese subsidi-
ary, in which the investments are actually made into the offshore company
and the subsidiary is the operating company. For the purposes of easy and
cheap formation, tax efficiency, as well as facilitating prospective exits in
offshore capital markets such as those in the U.S., Hong Kong and/or Sin-
gapore, the holding company is usually incorporated in offshore tax
havens such as the Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands.149 More
146. See Fred Gregura & Carol Li, Investment and Operating in Restricted Industries in
China, FENWICK & WEST LLP, available at http://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/
Invest_Operating_In_China.pdf.
147. LAURENCE J. BRAHM, CHINA AFTER WTO 219 (2002).
148. Shiyi Hao Wen Jinghun – Yitiao Fagui de Zhongguo Zhi Zaoyu
( ) [The Notice No 11 Panic: A Regulation’s Story with
Chinese Characteristics], 10 SHANGWU ZHOUKAN ( ) [BUSINESS WATCH] (2005),
available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/hkstock/hkstockresearch/20051020/15012049945
.shtml. This Yuxing incident was considered the direct cause for the China Securities Regula-
tion Commission to impose the “non-objection letter” requirement for Chinese firms seeking
overseas listing. See table 3.3.2 below.
149. Fred Greguras et al., 2008 Update to Doing Business in China via the Cayman
Islands, FENWICK & WEST LLP, available at http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/Publications/
Corporate/2008_Update_Business_China.pdf. For a more detailed account of the benefits of
using an offshore SPV to invest in China, see Greg Knowles, Cayman and BVI: The Benefit
for China in Times of Regulatory Change, 9 HONG KONG LAWYER (2010), available at http:
//www.maplesandcalder.com/fileadmin/uploads/maples/Documents/PDFs/CAYMAN%20
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complex forms of this structure are widely used in restricted industries in
China, in which foreign investors are not allowed to hold majority or con-
trolling stakes. In such complex forms, the de facto control from the off-
shore holding company over the operating entity in the People’s Republic
of China (P.R.C.) is materialized via contractual arrangements rather than
via direct equity stake in the latter. The charts below show how both the
two structures operate.
























Such offshore structures are usually set up in practice as follows: at the
time of seeking foreign investment, the Chinese founders who have been
operating a Chinese business firm will set up a holding company in an
offshore jurisdiction and then use it to acquire equity interests in the local
company, thus converting it into a Chinese subsidiary of the offshore en-
tity.150 This subsidiary will serve as the operating unit in China. As to the
more complicated structure that is used in investments into restricted in-
dustries, the offshore holding company will provide necessary funds to its
key directors or officers who are residents in China to capitalize or acquire
AND%20BVI%20THE%20BENEFIT%20FOR%20CHINA%20IN%20TIMES%20OF%
20REGULATORY%20CHANGE%20.pdf.
150. Peter Feist et al., China’s Private Equity Landscape, WEIL GOTSHAL PRIVATE EQ-
UITY ALERT (Jun. 2008), available at http://www.weil.com/files/Publication/9fc526ef-91f0-425
8-afb0-98e6e268fc8d/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/4884527e-a1dd-4ac1-a68a-a7cac78
eb6da/PEA_June_08.pdf, at 1.
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a Chinese business entity, which will hold the required Chinese govern-
ment-issued licenses and approvals.151 The directors or officers will act as
equity holders of the Chinese operating entity for the benefit of the off-
shore holding company.152 The offshore holding company does not have
any direct ownership interest in the Chinese entity; rather, the holding
company will establish a subsidiary in China,153 which will enter into vari-
ous agreements with the Chinese entity, which normally include loan
agreements, power of attorney agreements (voting agreements), exclusive
service agreements, share pledge agreements, and other operating agree-
ments.154 Taken together, these agreements provide the offshore company
with effective financial and operational control over the Chinese operating
entity.155
3.3.2 IMPORTANT BENEFITS OF THE OFFSHORE STRUCTURE WITHIN THE
VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT CONTEXT
Over the years, foreign investors, particularly global venture capital-
ists, have become comfortable with the offshore structure as they under-
stand and use it. From a technical point of view, the advantage of this
offshore investment structure is that it helps to circumvent the unfavorable
laws and regulations of China. Such an advantage results from the possibil-
ity of choosing the ideal governing law of the transaction. Normally, if
foreign VC investments are made directly within China, thus turning a
Chinese firm into a Sino-foreign joint venture, the governing law will have
to be the law of China.156 By contrast, if the transaction is structured off-
151. See Fred Greguras & Jianwei Zhang, 2008 Update to Investment and Operating in
Restricted Industries in China, FENWICK & WEST LLP, available at http://www.fenwick.com/
docstore/Publications/Corporate/Invest_Operating_In_China_2008.pdf, at 1.
152. Id.
153. This Chinese subsidiary may be wholly owned by the offshore holding company, or
may be a joint venture between the offshore holding company and the PRC operating com-
pany, as applicable in different situations.
154. Paul Gillis, Explaining the VIE Structures, CHINA ACCT. BLOG, available at http://
www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/explaining-vie-structures.html.
155. See Fred Greguras & Jianwei Zhang, 2008 Update to Investment and Operating in
Restricted Industries in China, FENWICK & WEST LLP, available at http://www.fenwick.com/
docstore/Publications/Corporate/Invest_Operating_In_China_2008.pdf, at 1. For a more de-
tailed description of the more complex contractual structure, and especially the function of
the contracts entered into between the entities, see Paul Gillis, Explaining the VIE Structures,
CHINA ACCT. BLOG, available at http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/explaining-vie-
structures.html.
156. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezuo Jingying Qiye Fa
( ) [Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (P.R.C.)]
art. 2 (adopted by the 2nd Session of the 5th National People’s Congress, July 1, 1979)
(amended for the first time, Apr. 4, 1990) (amended for the second time, Mar. 15, 2001);
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongwai Hezi Jingying Qiye Fa Shishi Xize
( ) [Implementing Measures for the Law on
Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Ventures (P.R.C.)] art. 55 (promulgated by the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Sep. 4, 1995); see also Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Waishang Duzi Qiye Fa Shishi Xize ( )
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shore in which the capital is actually injected into the holding company
outside China, the parties will have the liberty to mutually choose from
other laws than the Chinese law. It could be the law of a developed juris-
diction with substantial relation with the transaction, such as where the
firm aims to list on in the future or where the foreign venture capitalist
comes from.157 It has to be noted that, thus far, China still primarily relies
on imposing direct administrative approvals and technical restrictions,
such as those on foreign equity ownership, foreign exchange transfer, and
conversion approvals, to control the value and quality of foreign inward
capital flows.158 This means that under Chinese law, the relevant govern-
mental authority needs to review and approve investment contracts before
any investments in foreign currency can be converted into Renminbi and
made into China. With the aid of the offshore investment structure, for-
eign investors can conveniently enter the Chinese market without having
to try their luck with the government, which may reject the investment
contracts or call for unfavorable revisions to them.
In addition to the possibility of circumventing governmental scrutiny
over foreign investments, parties may get access to more efficient legal
rules that are not entirely available in China. As argued above, the general
lack of a share-based equity system in Chinese non-listed firms makes it
difficult for venture capitalists to use convertible preferred stock, which is
an efficient investment tool widely employed in the U.S. VC community to
obtain special economic rights such as liquidation preferences, anti-dilu-
[Implementing Measures for the Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (P.R.C.)] art. 2
(promulgated by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Dec. 12, 1990)
(amended, Apr. 12, 2001). See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Shewai Minshi Huo
Shangshi Hetong Jiufen Anjian Falü Shiyong Ruogan Wenti de Guiding
( ) [Rules of
the Supreme People’s Court on the Relevant Issues Concerning the Application of Law in
Hearing Foreign-Related Contractual Dispute Cases in Civil and Commercial Matters] art. 8
(promulgated by the Supreme Court of China, July 23, 2007), available at http://www.court.
gov.cn/qwfb/sfjs/201006/t20100628_6412.htm.
157. As an example, the series A convertible preferred shares purchase agreement be-
tween Sequoia Capital, a US venture capital firm and China Linong International Limited, a
BVI holding entity of China LandV Group, a leading Chinese agricultural company, chose
the Laws of California as the governing law. See http://contracts.onecle.com/le-gaga/linong-
spa-2007-02-14.shtml. Similarly, in a share purchase agreement where Softbank, a Japanese
venture capital firm, exited from Taobao Holding Limited, a Cayman Islands holding com-
pany of a leading Chinese online shop website, which is also a subsidiary of the Alibaba
group, by selling its shares there to Yahoo! Inc., the parties agreed on the law of the State of
New York as the governing law. See http://contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/planning/
purchase/5474.html. This kind of practice is not only identifiable for venture capitalists in
China. Venture capitalists in Taiwan have similarly stated that they use California law to draft
contracts for locally funded firms. By doing this, they can unofficially import U.S. venture
capital law to their countries. See David Ahlstrom & Garry D. Bruton, Venture Capital in
Emerging Economies: Networks and Institutional Change, 30 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY
AND PRAC. 299, 313 (2006).
158. See Donald Kimball & Fengjuan Xiao, Effectiveness and Effects of China’s Capital
Controls, 4 CHINA & WORLD ECON. 60, 61 (2005).
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tion adjustments and other rights in the investment contracts, as well as to
effectively monitor the invested company. The same also holds for em-
ployee incentive plans such stock options, which are important to VC in-
vesting in that they give entrepreneurs long-term incentives to stay and
serve the company, but are again difficult to use in China as a result of the
lack of share-based equity system. By structuring the VC investment off-
shore, in contrast, parties will be able to make use of such investment in-
struments in the holding company outside China without being deterred
by the regulatory limitations in the Chinese law, which would no longer be
mandatorily applicable.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the offshore investment structure
also provides parties to foreign investment transactions with feasible, flexi-
ble, and usually profitable exit options. Exit strategies are as crucial as
entry strategies, as they determine profits for investors. Typically, VC in-
vestors can exit from investments by selling their shares or equity interests
in the invested company on a public stock exchange after the portfolio
company is listed, or to a third party acquirer in a private sale. Either way,
if the investors or entrepreneurs want to seek exit abroad, using an off-
shore structure may be preferable to investing directly onshore, as Chinese
law imposes substantive and time-consuming approval procedures for any
Chinese company seeking foreign listing or foreign-financed merger and
acquisitions (“M&A”). Table 3.3.2 below summarizes the major laws and
regulations governing overseas stock issuance, listing, and mergers & ac-
quisitions from 1993 when China first adopted its company law code. It
can be seen from below that direct access to overseas stock exchanges has
been largely limited to those well-scaled companies (particularly state-
owned ones), and such access is only granted after going through lengthy
and complex review and approving processes. Rather, indirect access via
an offshore special purpose vehicle (“SPV”) was comparatively easier, es-
pecially during the period between 2003 and 2005, in which the “non-ob-
jection letter” requirement was lifted while new regulatory restrictions
were still not put in place.
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TABLE 3.3.2: BRIEF SUMMARY OF CHINESE REGULATIONS REGARDING
OVERSEAS STOCK ISSUANCE, LISTING, AND M&A
Time Regulation Significance Remark
29 Company Law Companies may list abroad
December upon the approval of the state
1993 securities regulation
authorities.
17 June 1996 Notice from the Companies first need to be Repealed as
Securities recommended by provincial from 21
Commission of the governmental authorities as December
State Council on the the pre-selection enterprises in 1999.159
Prerequisites, order to list abroad. Only 1 – Companies can
Procedures, and 2 enterprises may be apply for
Documentation recommended per province. overseas listing
Needed for directly at the
Recommending Pre- CSRC without




20 June 1997 Notice from the All major efforts for the
State Council on purposes of listing a domestic
Further company on a foreign stock
Strengthening the exchange, including but not
Administration of limited to acquisition, stock
Overseas Stock swap, or appropriation, should
Issuance and Listing be approved by provincial
governmental authorities and
reviewed by the state securities
regulation authorities.
29 Securities Law Approval from the state
December securities regulation authorities
1998 must be obtained before a
domestic company trades or
offers shares abroad, either
directly or indirectly.160
14 July 1999 Notice from A company qualifying for
China Securities overseas listing should, among
Regulation other things, have at least
Commission RMB400 million net assets,
Concerning the RMB60 million post-tax profits
Relevant Issues on for the past year, and will
Enterprises raise at least US$50 million
Applying For upon listing.
Overseas Listing
159. See Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu Feizhi Bufen
Zhengquan Bumen Guizhang de Tongzhi
( ) [Notice from China Securities
Regulation Commission on Abolishing Certain Securities Related Government
Departmental Rules] (promulgated by China Securities Regulation Commission, Dec. 21,
1999), available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI/zcfg/fzflfgml/P020060619698849539195.pdf.
160. However, the Securities Law does not spell out what activities shall constitute
“indirectly trading or offering shares abroad,” and thus would need the approval from
securities regulation authorities.
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Time Regulation Significance Remark
9 June 2000 Notice from A legal opinion from Chinese Repealed as
China Securities legal counsel is required if a from 1 April
Regulation firm seeks to issue stock or list 2003.161 No
Commission abroad. Such legal opinion will “non-objection
Concerning Several be reviewed by China letter” from the
Issues on Stock Securities Regulation CSRC is
Issuance and Listing Commission (“CSRC”). In required for
of Overseas order to enable the overseas stock
Companies with contemplated overseas stock issuance and
Domestic Interests issuance or listing, a “non- listing.
objection letter” must be
obtained from the CSRC
regarding the legal opinion.
24 January Notice from the If a domestic resident sells his Repealed by
2005 State domestic assets and/or stock in Notice No. 75.
Administration of exchange for overseas shares
Foreign Exchange or equity interest, he must
Concerning the obtain the prior approval from
Relevant Issues on the State Administration of







8 April 2005 Notice from the If a domestic resident transfers Repealed by
State his domestic assets and/or Notice No. 75.
Administration of equity into an overseas entity
Foreign Exchange and directly or indirectly holds
Concerning the the equity interests or shares
Relevant Issues on of the overseas entity, a
Registration of registration with the SAFE is
Overseas required. Similarly, any
Investments by subsequent capital increase,
Domestic Individual decrease, equity transfer,
Residents and merger, separation, equity
Foreign Exchange investment, and incurring
Registration of encumbrance with domestic
Foreign-Funded assets, should all be registered
M&As (Hui Fa with the SAFE.
[2005] No. 29)
(“Notice No. 29”)
161. See Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu Quxiao Di’er Pi Xing-
zheng Shenpi Xiangmu Ji Gaimian Bufen Xingzheng Shenpi Xiangmu Guanli Fangshi de Tonggao
(
) [Announcement of China Securities Regulatory Commission on Canceling the Sec-
ond Group of Administrative Approval Items and on Changing the Management Methods of
Some Administrative Approval Items] (promulgated by China Securities Regulation Com-
mission, Apr. 1, 2003).
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Time Regulation Significance Remark
21 October Notice from the Domestic residents can set up
2005 State SPVs, and use such vehicles to
Administration of engage in equity financing
Foreign Exchange activities. Registration with the
Concerning SAFE is required prior to the
Relevant Issues establishment or gaining
about Foreign control of any offshore holding
Exchange Control entity by Chinese residents.
on Domestic Moreover, SAFE also requires
Residents’ for retrospective compliance of





(Hui Fa [2005] No.
75) (“Notice No.
75”)
8 August Provisions on Approval from the Ministry of
2006 Foreign-Funded Commerce is needed before
Mergers and any Chinese individuals or
Acquisitions of companies can establish an
Domestic offshore SPV, use the SPV to
Enterprises acquire the domestic operating
(MOFCOM company and turn it into the
Ordinance [2006] subsidiary of the SPV. The
No. 10) subsidiary domestic company
(“Ordinance No. will hold a special business
10”) license valid only for one year.
Overseas listing must be
completed within one year
after the issuance of such
special business licence.
Approval by CSRC is needed
as a pre-requisite for an
offshore SPV that holds assets
in China to undertake a listing
outside China.
As can be seen in table 3.3.2 above, the promulgation of the Provisions
on Foreign-Funded Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises
(“Ordinance No. 10”),162 which followed the three Notices from the State
Administration of Foreign Exchange (Notices No. 11, 29, and 75 as sum-
marized in the table above) earlier in 2005, finally and conclusively draws
the practice of using an offshore SPV to acquire and own domestic inter-
ests under regulatory supervision. Consequently, governmental approval
becomes a prerequisite for such a SPV to be set up and used, e.g., for VC
financing and further overseas listing. The reality is, however, since Ordi-
162. Waiguo Touzizhe Binggou Jingnei Qiye Guiding ( )
[Provisions on the Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors]
(jointly promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, State-Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission of State-Council, State Administration of Taxation, State Ad-
ministration of Industry and Commerce, China Securities Regulation Commission, and State
Administration of Foreign Exchange, Aug. 8, 2006) (amended on June 22, 2009).
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nance No. 10 came into force, there has not been even one successful pre-
cedent that has managed to obtain approval from the Ministry of
Commerce.163 Rather, an alternative is used even more often to circum-
vent the requirements of Ordinance No. 10. As mentioned above, there
are two models of offshore investment structure (see figure 3.3.1). The key
difference between them is that, while the first achieves direct control by
the offshore SPV holding equity stake of the onshore operating entity, in
the second model it is the contractual agreements between the offshore
SPV’s Chinese subsidiary and the real operating entity in China that help
to establish indirect control by the offshore SPV. Given the possibility of
using the first and simpler model, the more complicated contractual model
was mainly employed when investing in restricted industries before
2006.164 After Ordinance No. 10, however, its usage was incidentally
pushed even further into those industries that do not prohibit majority
foreign ownership because the contractual arrangements in such a model
make it unnecessary for the offshore SPV to acquire and own equity inter-
ests in Chinese companies, thus rendering Ordinance No. 10 no longer
applicable.165 This contractual model is often more concisely referred to as
the VIE model. VIE stands for “variable interest entity,” which is origi-
nally a term used by the United States Financial Accounting Standards
Board to refer to an entity in which the investor holds a controlling inter-
163. ZHANG LONG ( ), ZHONGGUO QIYE JINGWAI SHANGSHI JIANGUAN
( ) [SUPERVISION AND REGULATION OF CHINA’S OVERSEAS LISTING]
ch. 3.2 (2011), available at http://lz.book.sohu.com/chapter-20561-116330683.html; see also Su
Jiang ( ), Erdu Bianshen de Youhuo – Zhongxiao Gongsi Hongchou Jiagou Huigui
Diaocha ( ) [The temptation to restructure for
the second time – an investigation into the disentanglement of the “red chip” structure of Chi-
nese SMEs], 21 SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO ( ) [21ST CENTURY BUSINESS HERALD]
Sep. 17, 2010, available at http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2010-9-20/2OMDAwMDE5ODI2O
Q_6.html; and Greg Knowles, Cayman Islands and BVI: The benefit for China in times of
regulatory change, 9 HONG KONG LAWYER (2010), available at http://www.maplesandcalder
.com/fileadmin/uploads/maples/Documents/PDFs/CAYMAN%20AND%20BVI%20THE%
20BENEFIT%20FOR%20CHINA%20IN%20TIMES%20OF%20REGULATORY%20CH
ANGE%20.pdf, pointing out that “[s]uch approval has proved difficult to obtain and is un-
likely to be forthcoming for anything other than the largest of deals.”
164. Wang Shanshan et al. ( ), Zhifubao Kaoyan: Haiwai Shangshi Gongsi VIE
Moshi Zao Tiaozhan ( ) [The Test Facing AliPay:
VIE Model of Overseas Listed Companies Challenged], 455 CAIXIN XINSHIJI
( ) [CAIXIN CENTURY] (2011), available at http://news.qq.com/a/20110620/
000543.htm.
165. To be sure, using the contractual model is not the only option to circumvent Ordi-
nance No. 10, while arguably is the most heavily used one. For the introduction of other
possible alternatives, see LI SHOUSHUANG & SU LONGFEI ( ), HONGCHOU BOYI:
SHIHAO WEN SHIDAI DE MINQI JINGWAI SHANGSHI ( )
[RED-CHIP GAME: OVERSEAS LISTING OF CHINESE PRIVATE COMPANIES IN THE TIMES OF
ORDINANCE NO. 10] (2011). See also Greg Knowles, Cayman Islands and BVI: The Benefit
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est that is not based on the majority of voting rights.166 This is exactly the
essence of the contractual model that is widely used by (foreign) investors
in many Chinese firms (most typically in Internet firms167).
Other than the benefits within the context of VC investments as men-
tioned above, using offshore investment structures can also serve other
purposes, which are not directly related to the VC investment process.
Among other things, one important motive for some Chinese entrepre-
neurs to set up an offshore holding company and to use it to acquire the
Chinese interests is to reduce their tax obligations. By doing so, the origi-
nal Chinese firm would be turned into a foreign-invested enterprise
(“FIE”), and under the then applicable Chinese taxation law regime, a
foreign investor was exempt from paying Chinese income tax for the divi-
dends received from an FIE.168  Moreover, Chinese law used to also grant
FIEs with various tax holidays and tax deductions, depending on such fac-
tors as their lines of business and locations, etc.169
166. For more explanation of VIE, see Summary of Interpretation No. 46 (revised De-
cember 2003): Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities—an interpretation of ARB No.
51(Issued 12/03), FINANCIAL ACCT. STANDARDS BD., available at http://www.fasb.org/st/
summary/finsum46r.shtml.
167. Jing Linbo & Wang Xuefeng ( ), Waizi Dui Woguo Hulianwang
Shichang Yingxiang de Yanjiu ( ) [A Research on the In-
fluence of Foreign Capital on China’s Internet Market], 5 CAIMAO JINGJI ( ) [FI-
NANCE & TRADE ECONOMICS] 97 (2009), available at http://www.lvzaiyi.com/wp-content/
uploads/downloads/2011/06/ .pdf.
168. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waishang Touzi Qiye He Waiguo Qiye Suodeshui
Fa ( ) [Income Tax Law for Foreign-
Funded Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises (P.R.C.)] art. 19 (promulgated by the National
People’s Congress, Apr. 9, 1991). Such preferential taxation treatment offered particularly to
foreign investors in FIEs was no longer available as from 2008, when China’s new Enterprise
Income Tax Law started to take effect. Under the new Enterprise Income Tax Regime, non-
resident firms are obliged to pay a reduced enterprise income tax at 10% for the dividends
they gained from FIEs. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa
( ) [Enterprise Income Tax Law (P.R.C.)] arts. 3, 4, 19 (adopted
at the 5th Session of the 10th National People’s Congress, Mar. 16, 2007); see
also art. 91 of Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa Shishi Tiaoli
( ) [Regulation on the Implementation Rules of Enter-
prise Income Tax Law (P.R.C.)] (adopted by the State Council at the 197th executive meet-
ing, Nov. 28, 2007). In case the foreign investor is an individual, see Caizhengbu, Guojia
Shuiwu Zongju Guanyu Geren Suodeshui Ruogan Zhengce Wenti de Tongzhi
( ) [Circular from the Ministry of
Finance and State Administration of Taxation on Some Policy Issues Concerning Individual
Income Tax] art. 2 (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance and State Administration of
Taxation, May 13, 1994).
169. Income Tax Law for Foreign-Funded Enterprises and Foreign Enterprise (P.R.C.),
supra note 168, arts. 6-9. Again, as a result of the consolidating the two separate tax regimes
applicable respectively to domestic-funded companies and FIEs into a universal one in the
new Chinese Enterprise Income Tax Law as from 2008, such FIE exclusive tax advantages
are now largely diminished.
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Therefore, in order to take advantage of these FIE-exclusive tax bene-
fits,170 some Chinese residents made use of the offshore SPV structure to
conduct so-called “round-trip investments,” where the offshore SPV was
set-up entirely for the purposes of turning the Chinese operating entity
into an FIE so that it can qualify for the relevant preferential FDI policies,
while actually no foreign investment is made into the offshore SPV.171 In
order to maximize tax saving effects, the foreign holding entity is usually
established in an offshore financial center, as corporations established
there typically only have to pay domestically very low income tax, or even
no income tax at all.172 Comparatively, it is neither necessary nor ideal to
go to developed jurisdictions such as the U.S. to set up the foreign holding
entity there for the same purpose.
Given that such practice has resulted in the loss of tax revenues,173 the
new Chinese Enterprise Income Tax Law imposes more strict scrutiny
over the offshore SPV structure and round-trip investments, which are
generally included into the Chinese taxation regime and are subject to the
relevant taxes.174 Consequently, it is now not only more difficult to set up
the offshore investment structure as a result of the series of regulations
after 2005, particularly the Ordinance No. 10, but also more expensive to
maintain it, as a result of the now consolidated taxation regime which
largely removed the competitive tax advantages that used to be exclusively
applicable to foreign-invested firms.
IV. HOW ARE TRANSACTIONS DONE IN PRACTICE?
After discussing the various alternatives of making VC investments in
China, including using offshore investment structures, I turn to real life
170. As indicated by a practitioner in the business of helping Chinese firms registering
their offshore holding entities, the offshore SPV structure can be used for multiple purposes,
such as investing, trading, or simply tax evasion, depending the clients’ particular business
needs. See Nan Yan ( ), Kaiman Huangyan: Zhongguo Qiye Li’an Mishi
( ) [Lies in the Cayman Islands: A Secret History of Chinese Com-
panies Moving Offshore], 30 ZHONGGUO JINGJI ZHOUKAN ( ) [CHINA ECO-
NOMIC WEEKLY] (2011), available at http://www.ceweekly.cn/html/Article/201108018821967
638312.html.
171. See Stefan Kaiser et al, Foreign Direct Investment in China: An Examination of the
Literature, in GREATER CHINA: POLITICAL ECONOMY, INWARD INVESTMENT, AND BUSINESS
CULTURE 55 (Chris Rowley & Mark Lewis eds., 1996). See also JAMES LAURENCESON &
JOSEPH C. H. CHAI, FINANCIAL REFORM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 99
(2003).
172. Craig M. Boise, Regulating Tax Competition in Offshore Financial Centers, in OFF-
SHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS AND REGULATORY COMPETITION, 1 (Andrew P. Morriss, ed.
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1266329.
173. Jin Renqing, Explanation on the Draft Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s
Republic of China (speech delivered at the 5th Session of the 10th National People’s Con-
gress), Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2007-03/08/content
_5819131.htm.
174. Enterprise Income Tax Law (P.R.C.), supra note 168, arts. 2, 3, 45; Regulation on
the Implementation Rules of Income Tax Law (P.R.C.), supra note 168, art. 4.
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cases to see how transactions are done in practice, and try to answer the
questions of how often the offshore investment structure has been used,
and what implications can be made. In order to answer these questions, I
looked at the corporate ownership and control structures of venture capi-
tal-financed Chinese firms with a particular focus on the location of the
entities actually receiving the venture capital funding. Because of the diffi-
culty of getting complete and accurate information about the corporate
ownership and control structures of non-listed firms, I only focused on
publicly listed firms in this paper. The paragraphs below elaborate this
data exercise.
4.1 Data Description and Overview
Data collection started with a full list of 467 private equity and venture
capital investment transactions in Mainland China (excluding Hong Kong
and Taiwan) from 1990 to 2005 (until May 31, 2005) as covered in the
VentureXpert database. I excluded buyout and turnaround transactions,
private investment in public equity (“PIPE”) transactions, bridge loan
transactions, and fund of funds transactions, but included early-stage
(seed, start-up, early, and expansion stages) as well as late-stage invest-
ments. The resulting sample consists of a total of 419 transactions of differ-
ent investment rounds by 211 venture capital firms and 290 disclosed funds
(both Chinese and foreign) into 304 disclosed Chinese firms (including
their offshore holding companies).175 Within these 304 Chinese firms and
by the cut-off date of the original dataset (May 31, 2005), there are 29
companies that either had already gone public, or were under registration
procedures with certain stock exchanges waiting to go public. These 29
firms then constitute the final sample that I will start to discuss from infra,
Section 4.2.
In order to provide a general overview of VC investment transactions
in China, the following figures and tables first present the descriptive sta-
tistics of the 419 VC transactions before the paper further continues with
the final sample of 29 public firms. As can be seen from figure 4.1.1 below,
VC investments were made in China throughout the 1990s, but the out-
burst of transactions was only witnessed around the turn of the century.
The data demonstrate two peaks in the number of deals, one lasting from
1999 to 2001 and the other from 2003 to the first half of 2005. The first
peak is directly explained by the dotcom bubble period when everybody
wanted to list on NASDAQ and take a share of the soaring market. Taken
together with table 3.3.2 above, one can see that the second peak corre-
sponds with the regulatory changes that took place during that period. Be-
cause there was largely no regulatory obstacle impeding the usage of
offshore investment structure after the 2003 repeal of the “non-objection
letter” and before the promulgation of the series of SAFE notices in 2005,
175. These numbers only cover the funds and firms that have disclosed themselves.
There are also a number of other undisclosed investors and Chinese investee firms, but they
are not included here.
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relocating (i.e., using an offshore SPV to acquire and hold) the Chinese
VC-invested firm outside of the country was technically easier to accom-
plish then than at any other time.
FIGURE 4.1.1: NUMBER OF CHINA’S VC TRANSACTIONS BY YEARS
As to the origin of investors, it is obvious from figure 4.1.2 that most of
them are foreign venture capitalists. Being the unquestionable leader in
the global venture capital industry, the U.S. also excelled in the Chinese
market in the sense that 129 out of the total of 290 VC funds, and 92 out of
the total of 211 VC firms came from the U.S. Comparatively, there were
only 39 VC funds and 30 VC firms that were domestic Chinese ones.
Other major foreign investors came from jurisdictions geographically near
Mainland China, such as Hong Kong and Singapore.
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FIGURE 4.1.2: ORIGIN OF VC INVESTORS
ORIGIN OF PE/VC FIRMS
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4.2 Usage of Offshore Investment Structures in VC Investment practice
4.2.1 Is it used or not?
It is obvious that in order to use the offshore investment structure,
regardless of the simple form or the more complicated VIE form, a new
company (the offshore holding company) must be established in a foreign
jurisdiction in the first place, unless the Chinese firm has already had a
foreign presence existing to serve that purpose. After that, the offshore
holding company will then either acquire an equity stake or indirect con-
tractual control of the operating company in China. Technically, this pro-
cess can be viewed as the entrepreneurial firm being relocated to a foreign
jurisdiction. Following the paper of Cumming, Fleming, and
Schwienbacher, corporate relocation is deemed to have happened when
the invested entrepreneurial firm was initially based in the Asia Pacific
region (in this paper, China) as of the time of the first round of VC invest-
ment, but later relocated to another foreign jurisdiction.176
In this paper, I examine the usage of the offshore investment structure
by Chinese firms once they were invested in by VC investors, i.e., whether
the Chinese entrepreneurial firms had been relocated to a foreign jurisdic-
tion upon receiving VC financing or not. To elaborate, I consider an in-
vested firm as already having a foreign presence at the time of the first
round investment, if the foreign presence was established at least one year
prior to the date of the financing. To be on the safe side, it is wise to allow
for such one-year gap in this respect, as the offshore investment structure
itself needs some time to be established for relocation. This means that it
would be more reasonable to consider a foreign SPV established several
weeks or a few months before the date of first round VC financing as
corporate relocation, instead of an already exited foreign presence.
Except for those companies that successfully got listed, whose corpo-
rate holding structures are disclosed and thus available to the public, it is
not easy to locate the equivalent for non-listed firms. Doing so often re-
quires plenty of assuming and guessing, and the information so found is
not always reliable. As such, out of the 304 disclosed Chinese firms, I only
focus on those that finally managed to achieve IPOs or at least submitted
their registration documents to the securities regulatory authority in cer-
tain jurisdictions within the time window covered by the VentureXperts
database (i.e., until May 31, 2005). Furthermore, I only focus on the first
round of VC transactions in these firms, not the later rounds, nor the
buyout and turnaround transactions, private investment in public equity
(“PIPE”) transactions, bridge loan transactions, and fund of funds transac-
tions (I already excluded them out of the scope of this paper in Section
4.1), even if they happened as the first round of investments. Taken these
factors all into consideration, the final sample consists of 29 firms, as
shown in table 4.2.1.
176. See Douglas Cumming et al., Corporate Relocation in Venture Capital Finance, 3
ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRAC. 1121, 1130 (2009).
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In table 4.2.1, the dates of IPO and investment rounds are given by the
VentureXpert database, which were double-checked and corrected (where
necessary)177 by comparing with the information as recorded in the com-
panies’ registration documents as well as in their official websites. Moreo-
ver, the VentureXpert database also provides information on the identity
and location of VC investors, so one is directly able to tell whether a trans-
action was totally funded by foreign venture capitalists or not. Other
items, such as the founding time of the original company, listing entity,
and entity receiving VC investments, were hand-collected. I looked at the
firms’ publicly disclosed documents as filed with the relevant stock ex-
changes, as well as their company websites and anecdotal reports to find
out the needed information.
It can be easily seen from table 4.2.1 that VC invested Chinese firms
tend to list abroad. Among all the 29 firms, there is only one domestically-
listed firm, namely, Guangdong Kelon Electrical Holdings Co. Ltd., which
was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. But even this single case was
actually part of a dual-listing strategy – the company’s IPO was first done
in Hong Kong in 1996, and the Shenzhen listing was three years later than
that. According to table 4.2.1, the U.S. was obviously the most popular
listing destination among VC financed Chinese firms – 17 among all the 29
firms chose to trade their shares on stock exchanges located there, mostly
on the NASDAQ. Overall, Chinese firms did not seem to have a diversi-
fied choice pattern in terms of choosing listing venues, and they are only
found to list in Hong Kong and Singapore other than the U.S.
177. For example, according to the VentureXpert database, the date of first round of
VC investments into Focus Media (China) Holdings Co., Ltd. was January 1, 2003. However,
the official website of Focus Media records June 2003 for the same fact. As such, I take the
June 2003 as the correct date and thus use it in my sample.
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The use of the VIE structure is also common among the firms in the
sample. As shown in table 4.2.1B below, 16 out of the 29 firms are found
to have used the VIE structure. This directly results from the fact that
most of the Chinese firms that received VC financing and achieved listing
engaged in the so-called “value-added telecommunications business.”
Under the Chinese law, telecommunication businesses are divided into
two broad categories, namely, infrastructure telecommunications and
value-added telecommunications businesses.178 Value-added telecommu-
nications are widely defined as those that utilize public network infrastruc-
ture facilities to provide telecommunications and information services.179
More specifically, such businesses include electronic mail service,
voicemail boxes, online database storing and searching, electronic data in-
terchange, online data processing and trading processing, value-added fax,
Internet connection service, Internet information service, and audio-visual
telephone meeting service.180
As such, it can be generalized that basically any so-called “dotcom”
firm, or any mobile phone service provider, will be considered as doing
one or more of the various telecommunication businesses, and thus will
need a license from China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technol-
ogy (the “MIIT”) for that purpose.181 The telecommunications business in
general (both the infrastructure and value-added categories) restricts for-
eign investors from taking majority ownership, and thus the MIIT license
will not be given to a firm where foreign investors hold more than 50% of
the equity stake therein.182 This means that foreign venture capitalists,
which were the main force of investors in China’s entrepreneurial financ-
ing business back then, were not able to retain direct control in Chinese
firms doing Internet service or content providing business. In contrast, us-
ing the contractual control model offered by the VIE structure turned out
to be a good choice for them as it helped to circumvent the direct equity
holding limit.
Moreover, given that all the Chinese interests will be indirectly con-
trolled by the holding entity located abroad, the VIE structure also en-
ables the offshore holding entity to consolidate the financials of the
Chinese operating companies (variable interest entities) into the group’s
178. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dianxin Tiaoli ( ) [Regu-
lation on Telecommunications (P.R.C.)] art. 8 (promulgated at the 31st regular meeting of
the State Council, Sep. 20, 2000).
179. Id.
180. See id. at Appendix.
181. Regulation on Telecommunications (P.R.C.), supra note 178, art. 9.
182. Waishang Touzi Dianxin Qiye Guanli Guiding ( ) [Pro-
visions on the Administration of Foreign-funded Telecommunications Enterprises] art. 4
(promulgated by the State Council on Dec. 11, 2001) (amended on Sep. 10, 2008). To be more
precise, the maximum equity holding limit for foreign investors in infrastructure telecommu-
nications business (except wireless paging business) is 49%, and for foreign investors in
value-added telecommunications business is 50%.
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overall financial statements.183 By the same token, VIE structure is also
often used in firms doing life insurance,184 advertising,185 travel and tick-
eting agency businesses,186 as these businesses also fall with the scope of
“restricted industries” according to the relevant Chinese laws and regula-
tions.187 Examples of such firms in my sample include Ping An Insurance
Company of China, Ctrip.com International, Ltd., 51job, Inc., eLong, Inc.,
and Focus Media (China) Holdings, Co., Ltd. Because the contractual con-
trol concept embodied in the VIE model was first tested successfully in the
listing of Sina.com in NASDAQ in 2000,188 the VIE model is also often
referred to as the “Sina model.”189
183. David Roberts & Thomas Hall, VIE Structures in China: What You Need to Know,
TOPICS IN CHINESE LAW: AN O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP RESEARCH REPORT 2 (2011), avail-
able at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6963/TICL_-_VIE_Structures_in_China.pdf.
184. Foreign investors are prohibited from holding more than 50% equity stake in a life
insurance firm; and such restriction still remains in the latest version of Catalogue for the
Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries. See Waishang touzi chanye zhidao mulu
( ) [Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries]
(jointly promulgated by the State Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of
Commerce, Dec. 24, 2011).
185. Foreign investors were prohibited from holding more than 49% in an advertising
firm in China. See Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries, id., at
Appendix.
186. The restrictions on foreign-invested travel agencies are not on the percentage of
foreign equity holding. Rather, Chinese law prohibits foreign-invested travel agencies from
setting up branches in China; and they are only permitted doing domestic travelling business
and not overseas travelling business. See Luxingshe Guanli Tiaoli ( ) [Regula-
tion on the Management of Travel Agencies] art. 32 (promulgated by the State Council, Oct.
15, 1996) (repealed by Regulation on Travel Agencies on May 1, 2009).
187. Zhidao Waishang Touzi Fangxiang Guiding ( ) [PROVISIONS
ON GUIDING THE ORIENTATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT] arts. 3-4 (promulgated by the
State Council, Feb. 11, 2002). It is stipulated therein that the government shall use the Cata-
logue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries, supra note 184, to review, approve
and police foreign-invested projects, which are divided into four broad categories, i.e., en-
couraged, permitted, restricted and prohibited.
188. For a recount of how Sina.com came up with the contractual control idea and
tested the waters on its implementation with the relevant regulatory authorities in China, see
Hulianwang Jingwai Shangshi Jingdian Anli: Xinlang Boli ICP Yewu Zai Mei Shangshi
Licheng ( ) [Classic Cases for
Overseas Listing of Internet Companies: How Sina.com Has Listed in the US After Stripping
Off its ICP Business], CAIFU ZHISHU ( ) [WEALTH INDEX], Oct. 25, 2005, available at
http://www.liangongsi.com/News/Internet_outside_the_classic_case_Sina_ICP_United_States
_listed/.
189. Who Owns What? The Perils of Investing When the Law is Unclear, THE ECONO-
MIST, July 7, 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18928526.
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TABLE 4.2.1B: USAGE OF VIE STRUCTURE IN VC-FINANCED
CHINESE FIRMS
VIE
Company Business Description as Structure
Company Name Recorded in VentureXpert Database Used?
51Job, Inc. (AKA: 51Net.com) Provides integrated human resource Y
services in China.
AsiaInfo Holdings, Inc. Provides internet-related information Y
technology and software services.
Beijing Watch Data System Company, Develops software for smartcard use. Y
Ltd.
Central Semiconductor Manufacturing Manufactures semiconductor wafers. N
Corp (CSMC Technologies)
China Finance Online (DBA: CF99) Provides financial and listed company Y
data and information in China.
China Netcom Corporation, Ltd. Provides services in the broadband N
telecommunications industry.
China Techfaith Wireless Develops wireless communication Y
Communication Technology Limited terminal products.
China Wireless Technologies Ltd Provides wireless telecommunications N
solutions.
Ctrip.com International, Ltd. Provides travel information, Y
reservations and other services.
Eagle Brand Ceramics, Inc. (AKA: Manufactures and distributes ceramic N
Eagle Brand International) tiles and sanitary-wares in China.
eLong, Inc. Provides online travel services. Y
Focus Media (China) Holdings Co., Operates an out-of-home advertising Y
Ltd. network in China.
Fuji Forunite (AKA: FUJI Food and Operates as a food and catering N
Catering Services) service provider.
Guangdong Kelon Electrical Holdings Manufactures refrigeration products. N
Co. Ltd.
Harbin Songjiang Brewery Co. Operates a microbrewery in the North- N
Eastern China market.
Hongguo International Holdings Designs, manufactures and sells ladies N
Limited fashion footwear.
Hurray! Solutions Ltd. Provides wireless value-added services Y
to mobile phone users in China.
IIN Networks International, Ltd Provides system integration and N
software development services.
Kingdee International Software Group Develops enterprise application N
Company Limited software.
KongZhong Corporation (FKA: Provides second generation, or 2.5G, Y
Communication Over The Air Inc) wireless interactive entertainment.
Linktone Ltd. Provides wireless communication Y
services.
NetEase.com, Inc. (DBA: 163.com) Provides online services for community Y
building and electronic commerce.
Ping An Insurance Company of China, Provides life, automotive, property, N
Ltd. and cargo related insurance services.
Ports Design Provides fashion and luxury goods. N
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VIE
Company Business Description as Structure
Company Name Recorded in VentureXpert Database Used?
Semiconductor Manufacturing Operates a holding company that N
International Corp. (AKA: SMIC) establishes semiconductor facilities.
Shanda Interactive Entertainment Operates as an online gaming Y
(AKA: Shanda Networking) company.
Sina Corporation (FKA: Sina.com) Provides a Chinese-language portal Y
and search engine.
Sohu.com Provides Internet communications, Y
media and commerce for China.
Tencent Technology Limited Provides instant messaging service. Y
Two firms in the table 4.2.1B above, namely China Netcom Corpora-
tion and Ping An Insurance Company of China, Ltd., are not found to
have used the VIE model when accepting foreign venture capital invest-
ments, although the lines of business they engage in are also restricted
ones, and they were both listed outside Mainland China. The major reason
that they didn’t employ the VIE model is that the foreign VC investors
only acquired minority stakes in these two firms when investing in
them.190 Both deals were identified in the VentureXpert database as later
stage transactions, where foreign investors were brought in to further ex-
pand these already sizable firms,191 and to better prepare them for forth-
coming IPOs in overseas stock markets. Arguably, this made it not as
190. As for China Netcom, the Feb. 2001 investment transaction in the amount of
US$325 million resulted in five foreign VC investors, including the News Corporation and
Goldman Sachs & Co. (invested through GS Capital Partners III, L.P.), acquiring 12% in the
then China Netcom. See Xinwen Jituan Rugu Zhongguo Wangtong, Jinjun Zhongguo Di-
anxin Shichang ( ) [News Corporation Acquiring
Shares in China Netcom: Marching into Chinese Telecommunications Industry], CHINABYTE,
available at http://news.chinabyte.com/436/1218936.shtml; As for Ping An Insurance, the June
1994 transaction in the amount of US$ 240.3 million resulted in Goldman Sachs (invested
through GS Capital Partners, L.P., and GS Capital Partners (Asia)) and Morgan Stanley
(invested through Morgan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund II) acquiring 13.7% stakes
in the firm. See 1994 Nian Mogen He Gaosheng Cangu Pingan Baoxian
( ]) [Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs Acquire Shares
in Ping An Insurance], SINA.COM, available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/insurance/bx
tb/20090922/15306780033.shtml; Cheng Zhiyun ( ) GAOSHENG DE ZHONGGUO SHENGYI:
GUOJI TOUHANG ZAI ZHONGGUO DE 20 NIAN ( )
[GOLDMAN SACHS’S CHINA BUSINESS: AN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT BANKING FIRM’S 20
YEARS IN CHINA] Ch. 1 (2011).
191. As for China Netcom, the money raised by this transaction in 2001, together with
the loans from major Chinese banks, was used to build up its optical fiber network in China.
See Kao Hongzun ( ), Kaoshi Lishi Disanji: Zhengyi Wangtong – Zijin Xionghou de
Tiaozhanzhe, Fuzhai Leilei de Zhengyizhe
( ) [Kao’s History Part 3:
Controversial Netcom – Deep-Pocketed Challenger, Deeply-Indebted Controversy], Jan. 24,
2011, available at http://bbs.c114.net/viewthread.php?tid=486907. As for Ping An Insurance,
it basically focused on non-life insurance business before 1994, and the capital raised from
the transaction was used to expand its life insurance business in China, see Cheng Zhiyun
( ]), id.
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necessary for foreign VCs to acquire the majority ownership as they nor-
mally do when financing small start-ups. More importantly, given the criti-
cal status of the two companies in their respective markets,192 as well as
the fact that the state and local governments held significant equity stakes
in them,193 it was unlikely that the two firms would let foreign VC inves-
tors acquire their majority equity stakes, as doing so might seriously dis-
turb the state’s interests in them. Therefore, because the low foreign
ownership would not trigger the foreign investment restrictions applicable
in their respective industries, the VIE model was not used to establish
indirect controlling rights in these two firms when foreign venture capital-
ists invested in them.
4.2.2 Where were venture capital investments actually made?
Section 4.2.1, supra, briefly examined the usage of the VIE model as
well as its direct correlation with industry policies on foreign investment in
China. This section continues to offer a closer look at the usage of the
offshore investment structure in general, regardless of either the simple
form and the VIE form. Normally, information about which entity the VC
investments were made into can be found in the introduction of the com-
pany and/or the overview of its history of development in the registration
documents submitted to the local securities regulatory authorities. Among
all the 29 firms in table 4.2.1, only 4 firms received their first round of VC
investment within China, while for 23 other firms, VC investments were
provided to certain offshore entities. The offshore entities could be the
original company if the firm was incorporated out of China when it first
started, or the entity that was finally listed in one of the overseas stock
markets, or some other offshore holding entity. In most cases, such other
holding entity was either reincorporated as the listing entity later in the
restructuring prior to listing, or it became a middle-level holding entity
192. China Netcom was one of the top six telecommunications operators in China in
1999, see Liu Qi ( ]), Tietong Tuoli Tiedaobu, Liuda Yunyinshang Jingzheng Geju Yi
Xingcheng ( ) [Tietong Spun Off from Ministry of
Railways: Competition of Top Six Operators Takes Shape], JINHUA SHIBAO ( )
[JINGHUA TIMES], Dec. 13, 2003, available at http://telecom.chinabyte.com/450/1749950.shtml.
And Ping An Insurance was already doing very well in 1994 by having an annual premium
revenue of RMB280 million, see http://about.pingan.com/fazhanlicheng/1994.shtml.
193. China Netcom was completely state-owned as of its incorporation, because all of
its shareholders at that time were state-owned or state-controlled entities. See Kao Hongzun
( ), Kaoshi Lishi Disanji: Zhengyi Wangtong – Zijin Xionghou de Tiaozhanzhe, Fuzhai
Leilei de Zhengyizhe ( )
[Kao’s History Part 3: Controversial Netcom – Deep-Pocketed Challenger, Deeply-Indebted
Controversy], Jan. 24, 2011, available at http://bbs.c114.net/viewthread.php?tid=486907. Ping
An Insurance was the same: it had only two shareholders as of incorporation, both represent-
ing the state. However, the state ownership was more and more diluted as a result of rounds
of equity restructurings over the years. See Sheng Dalin ( ), “Zhongguo Ping An” Ying
Qudiao “Zhongguo” Erzi ( ) [“China Ping An” Should Only
Be “Ping An”], DONGFANG JINBAO ( ) [ORIENTAL WEEKLY], June 24, 2009, availa-
ble at http://www.jinbw.com.cn/jinbw/xwzx/jbsb/20090624278.htm.
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between the original Chinese firm and the new listing entity, which was
incorporated in the restructuring prior to listing.
As mentioned in the beginning of supra, Section IV, using the offshore
investment structure to make VC investments can be also viewed from the
point of corporate relocation, because establishing an offshore holding en-
tity and using such an entity to acquire or control the onshore interests
means that a Chinese firm is technically relocated abroad. As to the ques-
tion of whether a corporate relocation has happened, I looked at the time
of the establishment of the entity into which the VC investments were
made. If the entity receiving VC investments was set up within one year
prior to the date of the first round of financing or after it, then I consider
this situation as relocation. Comparatively, if the entity receiving VC in-
vestments was set-up more than one year prior to the first round of financ-
ing, I consider the company as already having foreign existence.
Among the 29 firms in table 4.2.1, 10 firms have been relocated to a
foreign jurisdiction, 13 firms have already had a foreign presence prior to
the first round of financing, 4 firms did not have any relocation, and for
the remaining 2 firms, it is difficult to tell as no information can be found
about which entity received the first round financing. Similar to Cumming,
Fleming, and Schwienbacher, the relocations in my sample are also partial,
meaning that none of the invested firms fully relocated to a foreign coun-
try.194 There are some cases in which the invested firms opened subsidiar-
ies, branches, and/or liaison offices overseas as their business grew
bigger,195 but their primary place of business and production facilities
have always remained within China.
A more interesting point is where the offshore entities into which in-
vestments were actually made are located. Figure 4.2.2 below shows a dis-
tribution of the jurisdictions of the entities receiving VC investments.
Except the four cases where the investments were directly made into on-
shore entities within China, almost all the other entities receiving VC
financings were located in offshore tax haven jurisdictions, such as the
Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, and Hong Kong. There were
only two cases in which the VC investments were identified as happening
in the U.S. This was not because the two firms were relocated after ven-
194. Douglas Cumming et al., Corporate Relocation in Venture Capital Finance, 3 EN-
TREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRAC. 1121, 1134 (2009).
195. For example, Beijing Watch Data System Company, Ltd. has subsidiaries in 12
countries and regions (including China), and it even moved its international headquarters to
Singapore, but their primary place of business and production facilities remained in China.
See http://www.watchdata.com/us.jsp. Similarly, Focus Media had its Asia headquarters in
Singapore, but all of its branches that really do the business are scattered around the major
cities within China. See http://www.focusmedia.cn/en/aboutus/contactus.htm. Sina.com, a
leading Chinese web portal, has its US, Hong Kong and Taiwan versions, which are sepa-
rately run through local offices in these places. See http://www.sina.com.hk/service/about/
about.html.
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ture capitalists’ investments from China to the U.S., but because the two
firms were first incorporated as US companies from the very beginning.196
FIGURE 4.2.2: LOCATION OF ENTITIES ACTUALLY RECEIVING VC
INVESTMENTS
4.2.3 Is there really an issue of corporate relocation?
Based on the findings in Section 4.2.2 above, one can see that the cor-
porate relocations described in this paper are of a very different nature
than the corporate relocations discussed in the paper by Cumming, Flem-
ing, and Schwienbacher. First, besides those firms that already had foreign
presence, all of the destination firms in my sample into which the original
firms were relocated were set up within one year prior to the date of the
first round of VC investments, rather than thereafter. Technically, it is still
correct to regard these cases as relocations instead of already existing for-
eign presences. Because it takes time to restructure the interests located in
the origin country to the destination before the whole relocation can be
completed, it makes sense to have the destination firm ready a bit earlier.
In other words, it is a necessary preparation step for relocation.
Second, and more importantly, the destination firms of such reloca-
tions are all located in offshore tax haven jurisdictions, instead of in the
U.S. Similarly, as to those cases where the Chinese firms already had for-
196. As for Asiainfo Holdings, the registration documents filed with the SEC in-
troduces the company as “[w]e started our business in Texas through a predecessor company
in 1993 and are now incorporated in Delaware. In 1995, we moved our base of operations
from Dallas, Texas to Beijing, China to capitalize on emerging opportunities in the rapidly
developing Internet market in China.” As for Sohu.com, its registration documents in-
troduces the company as “[w]e were incorporated in Delaware in August 1996 as Internet
Technologies China Incorporated . . . In September 1999, we re-named our company
Sohu.com Inc. Substantially all of our operations are conducted through Sohu ITC Informa-
tion Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd., or Beijing Sohu, our wholly owned PRC subsidiary.”
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eign presences, such foreign presences are also primarily located in off-
shore tax haven jurisdictions, except for only two firms that were first
established in the U.S. after the founders graduated from their studies in
U.S. universities.197 The empirical examination of corporate relocations in
VC-financed Asian firms as conducted in the paper of Cumming, Fleming,
and Schwienbacher has one very important precondition: the destination
of corporate relocation was the U.S. Based on that, the authors then ar-
gued that the relocations were motivated by economic conditions as well
as an improvement in the laws of the country in which the entrepreneurial
firm is based. Third, in all of the cases where relocation happened and
firms already had foreign presences, the investing VC funds were all
foreign.
Taken together, although more firms tend to already have foreign
presences or be relocated abroad in Chinese VC financing transactions,
the characteristics of such corporate relocations do not fully support the
conclusions in the paper of Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher.
Rather, the fact that the foreign destination firms are ready before rather
than after venture capital investments are provided, and that the destina-
tion firms are located in offshore tax havens rather than the U.S., show
that such relocations and already existing foreign existences are just the
reflection of the wide usage of the offshore investment structure to make
VC investments in China.
Although these relocating practices indeed resulted in providing VC
investors with the access to better legal protection by virtue of technically
enabling them to conclude U.S.-style VC contracts with entrepreneurs and
to enjoy flexibility in terms of choosing applicable laws governing the con-
tracts, they can be at best partially explained by the “legality” argument, if
at all. The legality explanation is weak, because venture capitalists could
have simply done better to that end if they had relocated the Chinese
firms directly to the U.S., rather than to these offshore financial center
jurisdictions.198 Thus, the access to better legality must not be the top con-
cern of venture capitalists when they chose to relocate the Chinese firms
to, or default to, their already-existing foreign presences at some third off-
shore island jurisdictions.
The only plausible legality-related concern of venture capitalists when
doing so, if any, might be that the legal systems of many major offshore
financial centers, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Bermuda, BVI and Cay-
man Islands, were established based on common law principles and re-
197. The founders of Asiainfo were graduates from UCLA and Texas Tech University,
see http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1100969/0000950109-99-004557.txt; and the founder of
Sohu.com was a graduate from the MIT, see http://corp.sohu.com/20060507/n243126051.
shtml.
198. Fred Greguras et al., 2008 Update to Doing Business in China via the Cayman
Islands, FENWICK & WEST LLP, available at http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/Publications/
Corporate/2008_Update_Business_China.pdf, at 2, pointing out that “. . . [n]either [Bermuda
or Cayman Islands]’s laws, however, protect shareholders to the same extent as U.S. laws”.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\1-1\MPE106.txt unknown Seq: 54 31-JUL-12 10:59
54 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 1:1
sulted from their historical status as ex-British colonies.199 Given that
most of the VC investors investing in China were from the U.S., it could
be that they chose these offshore financial centers as relocation destina-
tions in order to access the common law there, which they are more famil-
iar and comfortable with. But this argument still does not solve the same
fundamental question: why not then directly move to the U.S.?
A competing, if not more convincing, explanation has to do with the
past experience of venture capital investors. The fact that these firms were
exclusively financed by foreign venture capital funds further supports this
explanation. I took great lengths in supra, Section III to explain the practi-
cal difficulties involved in using convertible securities (preferred stock and
convertible notes) directly in China. Moreover, the restrictive foreign in-
vestment regulations in certain VC-favored industries, as well as the gen-
eral foreign investment review and approval process and foreign exchange
control policies, further exacerbate such difficulties. As of the cut-off date
of the VentureXpert database, foreign venture capitalists were still the ma-
jor investors in China’s entrepreneurial financing market, and the largest
and most active group of them was from the U.S. Their past experience
with doing business was to do it in the “American way.”
The findings of Professors Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg seem to of-
fer support for such an argument.200 According to them, U.S.-style VC
contracts can virtually be replicated across a wide range of legal regimes
with enough effort or legal fees, and larger, more experienced VCs, VCs
with more exposure to the U.S. are significantly more likely to implement
U.S.-style contractual terms.201 VC investors can still manage to imple-
ment the U.S.-type of contract that they are more familiar with, even when
they make investments outside the U.S. These strong results for VC expe-
rience in their findings contrast with the modest results for legal, tax, and
accounting institutions.202
As such, compared with the conclusion in Cumming, Fleming, and
Schwienbacher, which argues that venture capitalists relocate their portfo-
lio firms to the U.S. in order to gain access to the better legal protection
and benefit from the stronger economic conditions there, the conclusion of
Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg seems more reasonable and capable of ex-
plaining the corporate relocations of VC-financed Chinese firms. Relocat-
ing potential Chinese portfolio firms to some third offshore island
jurisdiction looks more like a sophisticated contracting technique, which
was employed to circumvent the differences between local legal regimes,
199. G. Scott Dowling, Fatal Broadside: The Demise of Caribbean Offshore Financial
Confidentiality Post USA PATRIOT Act, 17 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 259 (2004), available at http://
www.porterscott.com/docs/Caribbean.pdf. See also Marc Montgomery, A Portrait of Success:
The Rise of the Cayman Islands as an Offshore Financial Center, 12 RMC 33, 67 (2001).
200. Steven N. Kaplan et al., How do Legal Differences and Experience Affect Financial
Contracts?, 16 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 273 (2007).
201. Id. at 275.
202. Id. at 293.
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and to enable investors to more conveniently use the U.S.-type of VC con-
tracts and convertible preferred stock that they are familiar with.
The key difference between the “experience explanation” and the “le-
gality explanation” is that simply trying to replicate U.S.-style VC con-
tracts does not necessarily mandate the firms to be relocated to the U.S.
(which has the really better laws). Instead, it would be enough if the legal
regime of the relocation destinations allow the use of the instruments
needed in the U.S.-style VC contracts, such as convertible preferred stock
(note), and employee stock options and so on,203 even if the laws there are
not comparable to those in the U.S. in terms of protecting investors.204
Thus, it is more experience that dictates venture capitalists to do what was
most convenient for them, and not really the better law that attracted
them to set up these offshore structures and relocate the Chinese firms
abroad.
Of course, it cannot be denied that relocating Chinese entrepreneurial
firms to offshore financial centers also incurs benefits other than techni-
cally facilitating VC investments. To generalize, an offshore financial
center or tax haven normally would have the following characteristics:
“low or zero taxation, moderate or light financial regulation, and financial
secrecy and anonymity.”205 In addition, offshore financial centers are also
attractive due to their usually accessible rules regarding the formation and
operation of corporate vehicles.206 Each of these characteristics can be
quite relevant for business parties, including both venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs.
To illustrate this point, compared to the firms that were relocated
aboard upon the first round of VC, more firms in table 4.2.1 actually al-
ready had foreign presences before that. It could have been any of a set of
intertwined reasons that drove the entrepreneurs to engage in these relo-
cations before any venture capitalist had emerged. It could be that they
were interested in gaining access to one or more of the benefits just men-
tioned above. Alternatively, and as already discussed in supra, Section
203. Fred Greguras et al., 2008 Update to Doing Business in China via the Cayman
Islands, FENWICK & WEST LLP, available at http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/Publications/
Corporate/2008_Update_Business_China.pdf, at 2, pointing out that “[a] key consideration
[in choosing a jurisdiction of incorporating the holding company] for investors is that a con-
ventional security such as preferred stock be available for financing. For employees, stock
options and other equity incentives need to look and feel the same as those of a U.S.
corporation”.
204. Id. at 2, pointing out that “. . . [n]either [Bermuda or Cayman Islands]’s laws,
however, protect shareholders to the same extent as U.S. laws”.
205. Offshore Financial Centers: IMF Background Paper, IMF, June 23, 2000, available
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm. See also Andrew P. Mor-
riss, Changing the Rules of the Game: Offshore Financial Centers, Regulatory Competition &
Financial Crises, 15 NEXUS: CHAPMAN’S J. L. & PUBLIC POLICY 15, 20-26 (2009-2010).
206. Joseph McCahery & Erik Vermeulen, Mandatory Disclosure of Blockholders and
Related Transactions: Stringent Versus Flexible Rules, (24 Sep. 2011) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1937476.
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3.3.2 above, it could be that the entrepreneurs felt it was important to take
advantage of the preferential taxation treatments to FIEs as well as for-
eign investors thereof, so that they set up holding companies in offshore
tax havens to turn their firms into FIEs. Additionally, it could also be that
Chinese entrepreneurs intentionally set up the structure and relocated
their firms abroad in order to enhance their accessibility towards foreign
investors (including venture capitalists), knowing that having a foreign
parent company holding their Chinese interests would help to facilitate
potential foreign investments from outside China.
The more important message here, however, is not to pinpoint the rea-
son that drove pre-VC relocations. Rather, the key finding is that regard-
less of the possible reasons, the VC investors in the sample in the end all
defaulted to the already established foreign presences and made use of
them to invest in Chinese entrepreneurial firms. In other words, although
not necessarily set-up as a result of receiving VC investments, such off-
shore holding structures that were created by relocating the Chinese firms
abroad, still pragmatically facilitated foreign VC investors. They were will-
ing to make use of the offshore holding structures, because it would be
easier for them to do so compared with doing the transactions directly
within China, or relocating the offshore holding firm further to developed
jurisdictions, such as the U.S. In this regard, it further underlines that us-
ing offshore investment structures and relocating Chinese entrepreneurial
firms to some third offshore financial centers is of a pragmatic nature and
occurs due to reasons of convenience, rather than being motivated by ac-
cess to better legality in developed jurisdictions.
According to Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher, in addition to
legality related motivations, VC-backed companies located in countries
with weaker economic conditions and lower populations are also more
likely to relocate to countries with stronger economic conditions and
greater populations in order to be closer to potential customers at the time
of exit and improve the expected rate of return of the investment.207 Eco-
nomic conditions are irrelevant as a motive for relocating from China,
which is not only the world’s largest market, but also has a vast economy
that has been growing with significant rates over past two decades. On the
contrary, the very first reason that foreign investors go to China is exactly
to gain access to the numerous Chinese customers in the big market, and
get their share of the growing economy there. Therefore, the fact that
most entrepreneurial Chinese firms were indeed relocated out of China
based on the findings from the sample in this paper means that the conclu-
sion of Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher is again not supported
here.
The sample in this paper only focused on those firms that managed to
list (or at least were in the registration process in order to offer shares to
the public) prior to May 2005, and found that offshore investment struc-
207. Douglas Cumming et al., Corporate Relocation in Venture Capital Finance, 3 EN-
TREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRAC. 1121, 1126, 1149 (2009).
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tures were widely used among these firms, with many of them being tech-
nically relocated abroad as a result of using such structures. One may
argue that limiting the scope of this research only to listed firms can be
biased, in a sense that offshore investment structures might be particularly
heavily employed by overseas-listed firms than by non-listed firms. Al-
though this may make sense, it is still reasonable to conclude that for those
VC-financed firms that were not yet listed, such offshore investment struc-
tures were also widely used, at least when a firm was exclusively financed
by foreign venture capitalists. The is because, from the very first round of
investments into portfolio firms, venture capitalists already think of possi-
ble exits, and the way of structuring their investments must also serve that
purpose.
It is already widely recognized wisdom that the most ideal exit for VC-
backed firms is to achieve an IPO, because it not only tends to generate
good returns for both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in a stock-mar-
ket-centered capital market, but it also enables entrepreneurs to regain
their control over their company, which gives them an important incentive
to devote their efforts towards the firm’s success.208 Arguably, one of the
important reasons for the remarkable success of U.S. innovation and the
VC industry is that the U.S. has a highly active stock market.209 Although
the attractiveness of the U.S. stock market may be somehow discounted
nowadays given the impact of the financial crisis in the past few years, as
well as due to fierce competition from other stock markets around the
world, it was generally considered as a much better exit option for good
Chinese firms compared to China’s own stock exchanges.
This is because, although having been growing very fast, the Chinese
stock market was often seen as illiquid, inefficient, and unreliable, bearing
little correlation to China’s underlying economic growth,210 and was not
really very open to small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”) as opposed to
large-scaled, especially state-owned firms. Therefore, it was in line with
the interests of both Chinese entrepreneurs and foreign venture capitalists
to aim at exiting via IPOs in overseas stock markets, most ideally in the
U.S. Because offshore investment structures can also function to facilitate
overseas listings, it is reasonable to think that such structures should be
widely employed upon first investing in Chinese firms, regardless of
whether the invested firm can achieve the desired IPO in the end.
208. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Does Venture Capital Require an Active
Stock Market? 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 36, 43 (2005). See also Bernard S. Black & Ronald J.
Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47
J. FIN. ECON. 243, 243 (1998).
209. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 274 (1998).
210. Hua Cai, Bonding, Law Enforcement and Corporate Governance in China, 13
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 82, 85 (2007).
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4.3 Discussion of the Findings, Caveats, and Future Research
The data discussed in this article ends May 31, 2005. Future research
could examine whether the transactions after the first half of 2005 would
also show a similarly high rate of relocations towards foreign jurisdictions,
particularly with respect to those using an offshore investment structure to
access tax havens. Such research could be highly interesting in that it will
empirically answer the question of whether corporate relocations among
VC investments in China are a sustainable phenomenon driven by deep-
rooted economic and legal inefficiencies as suggested by Cumming, Flem-
ing, and Schwienbacher, or are more a “fad” largely resulting from the
tendency among VC investors to replicate their past experiences of using
U.S.-style contracts, as suggested by Kaplan, Martel, and Stromberg.
Several new trends emerging after 2005 may contribute to answering
this question. From an economic point of view, the attractiveness of the
Chinese domestic stock markets towards VC-financed firms has improved
considerably relative to before. This is particularly true after the launch of
ChiNext,211 the Chinese equivalent of NASDAQ, which was particularly
designed for VC-backed SMEs and has already provided high valuation
and high premiums for the firms that were first listed there.212 From a
legal point of view, and as I already show in supra, Section 3.3.2, with the
enactment of a number of regulations from the second half of 2005 requir-
ing offshore investment structures to be approved and registered with the
relevant Chinese governmental authorities, relocating a Chinese firm out
to a foreign country is not as easy as it was before.213 Moreover, the Chi-
nese government has also started to carry out a series of regulatory at-
tempts aiming at promoting onshore VC investments, as well as providing
impetuses for foreign venture capitalists to consider creating their Chinese
investment funds in China’s own currency.214
Put together, faced with the recent developments in China’s own on-
shore capital market and legal framework, as well as the strengthened reg-
ulatory scrutiny over the practice of setting up a special purpose vehicle to
acquire Chinese interests, one may expect that offshore listings might be-
come less attractive among Chinese firms both substantively and techni-
cally, rendering them more willing to remain in China and seek exits on
211. ChiNext was launched on Oct. 23, 2009. See Samuel Shen & Fion Li, China
Launches Second Board for Start-ups, REUTERS, Oct. 23, 2009, available at http://www.reuters
.com/article/2009/10/23/chinext-launch-idUSSHA27095520091023.
212. David Barboza, A New Chinese Stock Exchange Opens with a Surge, N. Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2009, at B3.
213. See supra note 163 and the accompanying text.
214. Most importantly, such regulatory attempts include, among other things, the pro-
mulgation of the Interim Measures for the Administration of Start-up Investment Enter-
prises, supra note 110; and Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hehuo Qiye Fa
( ) [Partnership Enterprise Law (P.R.C.)] (promulgated by the
Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 23, 1997) (amended Aug. 27, 2006) (technically allowing Chinese
PE/VC funds to be also set up as limited partnerships).
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the China’s own A stock market. The legality explanation would predict a
lower rate of corporate relocations, resulting from the improvement of the
local legal and institutional environment, while the experience explanation
would not predict a significant reduction of relocations, as VC funds will
still continue to do so (maybe at the cost of even higher legal fees and
more complicated techniques) for the purpose of conveniently implement-
ing U.S.-style contracts.
V. CONCLUSION
Following the economic theory of venture capital financing, a financial
contract is economically efficient for VC investments if it can help to re-
duce agency costs arising from information and incentive problems. The
VC investment contracts widely used in the U.S. venture capital industry,
which is the most successful in the world, largely achieve these purposes.
At the core of these U.S. venture capital investment contracts is the use of
convertible preferred stock, which allows venture capitalists to obtain spe-
cial economic rights such as liquidation preferences, anti-dilution adjust-
ments, and other rights that are fundamental to the financial mandates of
VC firms, and also ensures that they can effectively monitor entrepreneurs
in portfolio companies. However, due to the lack of a share-based equity
system in China’s business practice, foreign venture capitalists are actually
deterred from directly using convertible preferred stock when investing in
China.
Based on the analysis of the relevant Chinese laws and regulations gov-
erning the corporate governance structure of VC-invested firms, as well as
the discussion over the feasibility of employing a set of different alterna-
tives to make direct and indirect VC investments in Chinese portfolio
firms, this article studies a hand-collected sample consisting of the twenty-
nine VC-backed Chinese portfolio firms that have been financed and
listed from 1990 to 2005 to empirically show how the investments were
actually done in practice.
It is found that the financing of most of these firms actually happened
outside China in certain offshore entities, which reflects the wide use of
offshore investment structures to make VC investments in China. Al-
though using such structures can be viewed as relocating the financed Chi-
nese firms abroad from a technical point of view, doing so is different from
strategic corporate relocations motivated by the need to access more effi-
cient legality and economic conditions. For the ten of twenty-nine firms
that were relocated as of the first round of VC financing, the destinations
of such relocations were not the U.S., but were offshore tax havens such as
the Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands. Similarly, for the thirteen
firms that already had foreign presences, their presences were also mainly
located in these offshore financial center jurisdictions.
Based on an analysis of the possible motivations of the Chinese firms
and their VC investors to relocate to foreign countries, this article argues
that compared to the influence of legality and economic conditions, the
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experience of venture capital funds seems to be a better explanation for
the corporate relocation phenomenon in China’s VC financings, which ac-
tually reflects more of a contracting technique to circumvent unfavorable
Chinese laws and conveniently implement U.S.-style contracts. In this
sense, and within the particular setting of China, real strategic corporate
relocation in venture capital finance is not really yet an issue.
